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Comments
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE
HOME SCHOOLING STATUTES
I. INTRODUCTION
Home schooling' is the education of children in the home as op-
posed to education in an institutional setting away from the home.2 Esti-
mates of the number of families nationwide educating their children at
home range as high as one million.3 Typically, the teachers in home
schools are the parents themselves. 4 While there are a variety of reasons
why parents choose to undertake the considerable task of instructing their
children at home, the primary reasons nearly always are academic or reli-
1. This Comment uses the terms "home schooling," "home education," and
"home instruction" interchangeably.
2. See Mark Murphy, A Constitutional Analysis of Compulsory School Attendance
Laws in the Southeast: Do They Unlawfully Interfere with Alternatives to Public Education,
8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 457, 457 (1992) (defining home schooling as "the teaching of
a child in the home by the child's parent or guardian"); Brian D. Ray, A Compari-
son of Home Schooling and Conventional Schooling: With a Focus on Learner
Outcomes 4 (1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oregon State University,
available through Educational Resource Information Center (ERIC)) (defining
home schooling as "a learning-teaching situation wherein children spend the ma-
jority of the conventional day in or near their home in lieu of attendance at a
conventional institution of education").
3. See Donald D. Dorman, Michigan's Teacher Certification Requirement Applied to
Religiously Motivated Home Schools, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 733, 733 n.1 (1990) (esti-
mating that between 10,000 and one million families educate their children at
home); see also Murphy, supra note 2, at 457 (estimating that one million families
educate their children at home (citing RAY E. BALLMAs, THE How AND WHY OF
HOME SCHOOLING 15 (1987))); William Celis III, Schooling at Home Draws Lawsuits to
Doorsteps, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1992, at B15 (citing Federal Education Department
estimate of 500,000 children being educated at home); Karel Holloway, Alternative
Schoolstyles, DAL. MORN. NEWS, Mar. 8, 1994, at 20A (estimating that 500,000 to one
million children are educated at home); Thomas Toch et al., Schooling in Family
Values, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REP., Dec. 9, 1991, at 73 (estimating that over
300,000 children are educated at home).
4. See Ray, supra note 2, at 4 (concluding that "[p]arents or guardians are the
primary educators of [home school] children");J. Michael Smith & ChristopherJ.
Klicka, Review of Ohio Law Regarding Home Schooling, 14 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 301, 301
(1987) (stating that "[t]he teachers in a home school are generally the parents").
According to Dr. Brian Ray's research, home school parents often share the follow-
ing characteristics: both parents actively participate in instruction, with the mother
serving as the teacher most of the time; both parents have attended or graduated
from college; household income is $20,000-$30,000; both parents attend religious
services regularly; and the family has three children. Ray, supra note 2, at 40-41.
(1309)
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gious.5 Many parents simply have become disillusioned with the educa-
tion available to their children in the public schools,6 and find private
institutions too expensive 7 or distant from the home to be a viable alterna-
tive.8 Religiously motivated parents often believe that they have a religious
duty to personally educate their children, incorporating aspects of their
faith into each lesson.9
5. See, e.g., Debra D. McVicker, The Interest of the Child in the Home Education
Question: Wisconsin v. Yoder Re-examined, 18 IND. L. Rv. 711, 711 (1985) (stating
that most significant motivations of home schoolers are "the perceived inadequacy
of public schools and the rise of religious fundamentalism in the United States");
Smith and Klicka, supra note 4, at 302 (stating that "[t]here are two primary rea-
sons that most [home school] parents have chosen to home school their children
- religious and academic").
A 1984 study identified six factors that motivate parents to instruct children at
home: 1) perceived unsuitability of institutional education for the particular attrib-
utes of the child; 2) desire for control over the child's education; 3) concerns
about the child's socialization; 4) disagreement with the basic approach of institu-
tional instruction; 5) disagreement with course content; and 6) desire to take a
personal interest in the child's development. James M. Henderson, Missouri Home
Education: Free at Last?, 6 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 355, 356-58 (1987) (citing D.
Williams, Understanding Home Education: Case Studies of Home Schools 4 (April 1984)
microformed on ERIC No. ED 244392 (Educational Resource Information Center)).
6. Dorman, supra note 3, at 736. This disillusionment is fueled by a range of
factors, from general disenchantment with the perceived mediocrity of public
school education to specific complaints about course content and the absence of
individualized instruction. Id. Other examples of specific complaints about pub-
lic schools include the inordinate amount of wasted time, the stifling of creativity
and individuality, and concerns about safety and morality. Fahizah Alim, Changing
the Rules, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 27, 1993, at SCI.
7. See, e.g.,John S. Baker, Jr., Parent-CenteredEducation, 3 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETH-
ICS & PUB. POL'Y 535, 546 (1988) (noting that private school tuitions, that must be
paid in addition to taxes paid for public schools, are obvious disincentive to enroll-
ment in private schools as alternative to public school education); Murphy, supra
note 2, at 458 (stating that one reason to home school is "[the] inability to afford
private school tuition").
8. See, e.g., State v. Jernigan, 412 So. 2d 1242, 1243-44 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982).
In Jernigan, home schooling parents were convicted for violating Alabama's com-
pulsory school attendance laws based on their failure to send their children to a
public school or an approved substitute. Id. The parents were devout Catholics
and believed that their children's religious salvation would be endangered if the
children received a secular education at the local public school. Id. at 1243. Be-
cause there was no parochial school in their county, the parents thus decided to
educate their children at home. Id.
9. See Smith & Klicka, supra note 4, at 302. Other religious reasons to home
school include disapproval of the secularization of public schools and a perception
of rampant immorality in the public school system. Neal Devins, Fundamentalist
Christian Educators v. State: An Inevitable Compromise, 60 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 818,
820-21 (1992). Devins noted that many religiously motivated home schoolers are
alarmed by their perception of secularization of public schools, evidenced in
United States Supreme Court decisions prohibiting organized prayer, Bible read-
ing and teaching of creation theory in public schools. Id. (citing Epperson v. Ar-
kansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (prohibiting teaching of creation theory in public
schools); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (prohibiting Bible
reading); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962) (prohibiting organized
prayer)). In addition, religious educators disapprove of what they perceive as
[Vol. 39: p. 13091310
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Opposition to home schooling is grounded in the belief that home
instruction is harmful to the social and intellectual development of the
child.10 Opponents contend that the home environment cannot provide
the interaction with other children that is a vital part of the maturation
process and may result in social retardation. 11 Critics also argue that par-
ents may not be able to provide the quality of instruction that is found in
widespread immorality in public schools, evidenced by lack of discipline, sexual
permissiveness and drug and alcohol abuse. Devins, supra note 9 at 821.
A high percentage of home schoolers are conservative or born-again Chris-
tians. See Carol Kotlarczyk, Lesson Plans, CHI. TmB., Nov. 17, 1991, at D3 (stating
that studies done by Home School Legal Defense Association indicate that 90% of
home school parents are born-again Christians); see also Thomas Toch et al., supra
note 3, at 73 (estimating that 75% of home schoolers are conservative Christians).
Specifically, a significant number of Mormons, Seventh-Day Adventists, Amish and,
more recently, Fundamentalist and Evangelical Protestants have elected to home
school their children. See Baker, supra note 7, at 549.
10. See Dorman, supra note 3, at 737. Dorman lists four categories of objec-
tions to home schooling: concerns about social retardation, loss of funding for
public schools if enrollment decreases, possible instructional inadequacy and pos-
sible conflicts of interest between the parent and child. Id.
Concerns about social retardation are exemplified by the worries of Joan
Witherbee, an elementary school principal in the Chicago area, who questions how
home school students will develop the nuances of social skills that non-home
school students develop through group discussions and working cooperatively with
peers. Kotlarczyk, supra note 9, at D3. The National Association of School Boards
also believes that home schooling hinders the development of social skills. See Wil-
liam Celis III, Growing Number of Parents Are Opting to Teach at Home, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 1990, at Al (quoting Gene Wilhoit, executive director of National Associa-
tion of School Boards, as stating that: "[c] hildren should be in the traditional set-
ting because home schooling takes away from a child's social skills. .. ").
Fears about loss of funding are justified. See Baker, supra note 7, at 543-45
(explaining that amount of state funding to public schools depends upon number
of children in attendance). "School districts around the country receive an aver-
age of $4000 to $7000 in state and federal aid" per student and a district risks
losing some or all of this amount when a student leaves one of its public schools.
See Celis, supra note 3, at B15.
Thomas Shannon, the former executive director of the National School
Boards Association, concerned about instructional inadequacy and worried that
the interests of the parent and child might conflict, decried home schooling as
"[a] giant step backward into the 17th century." Mary Esch, For More Kids, School
and Home Are the Same Place, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 17, 1991, at 3D. Shan-
non added that "[the Association is] very concerned that many parents who think
they are qualified to teach their youngsters, simply are not." Id.
11. See Dorman, supra note 3, at 737. Objective measurements of the self-
esteem of children who are instructed in the home, however, may indicate that
such concerns are misguided. See Baker, supra note 7, at 554 (stating test scores
indicate that home schooled children are not socially deprived). One of the few
tests of the socialization of home school students was performed by researcher
John Wesley Taylor, who examined student scores on a test known as the Piers-
Harris Children's Self-Concept Scale. See Smith and Klicka, supra note 4, at 304. Home
school students scored significantly higher than their conventionally schooled
counterparts on the test, with half of the home school students scoring above the
90th percentile. Id. Taylor thus concluded that home school students are not
socially deprived. See Baker, supra note 7, at 554.
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public, private or parochial schools. 12 One commentator has further as-
serted that home schools are "highly likely to be racially exclusionary."
13
The result of these divergent interests has been, predictably, a heated bat-
tle in various state courts and legislatures over the legitimacy of home
schooling.
This Comment will examine the heated debate that has arisen over
home schooling. First, this Comment will discuss the history of compul-
sory attendance laws.14 Next, this Comment will examine the competing
interests between parents and state governments in controlling the educa-
tion of children, as delineated by the decisions of the United States
12. See Dorman, supra note 3, at 737. However, home school students have
equaled or outperformed their public school counterparts on numerous national
and state achievement tests. See Smith and Klicka, supra note 4, at 302-03 (citing
separate studies of Dr. Raymond Moore (Moore, Research and Common Sense: Thera-
pies for Our Home Schools, 84 TCHRS. C. REc. 355, 372-77 (Colum. U. 1982)) and
state departments of Tennessee, Alaska, North Carolina and Washington, all of
which concluded that home school students perform at or above-average levels on
standardized achievement tests). Dr. Brian D. Ray of the National Home Educa-
tion Research Institute states that there have been between 60 and 70 studies of
home school students, all of which have produced similar results. See Holloway,
supra note 3, at 20A (stating that 60 or 70 tests have found that home schooled
students have "far higher average scores on nationally standardized tests than
many public school students"). Additionally, an estimated 50% of home school
students attend college, a rate comparable to that of public school students. See
Toch et al., supra note 3, at 73.
13. Ira C. Lupu, Home Education, Religious Liberty, and the Separation of Powers: A
Comment on Care and Protection of Charles, 72 MASS. L. REv. 47, 55 (1987). Gene
Wilhoit, former executive director of the National Association of School Boards,
agrees with Professor Lupu, stating that "home schooling . . .isolates children
racially and ethnically." Celis, supra note 10, at Al.
Home schooling may indeed have been used for a discriminatory purpose in
Duval County, Florida, where a father preached a religion of segregation to his
children during home school. See TA.F. & E.M.F. v. Duval County, 273 So. 2d 15,
18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (noting that father was teaching children under aus-
pices of church that encouraged racial segregation). Among the father's beliefs
was the notion that it is sinful to associate with persons of African or Asian ances-
try. Id.
Another possible use of home schooling for a discriminatory purpose oc-
curred in the town of Arcadia, Florida. Larry Perl, 'Town Without Pity' Reflects on
Treatment of Brothers with AIDS, FT. MEYERS NEws-PREss, Dec. 13, 1992, at A6. When
several brothers infected with the HIV virus enrolled in the local public school, an
unspecified number of parents removed their children from the public school and
began programs of home instruction. Id. Whether this action by the parents was
motivated by health concerns or AIDS-related biases is difficult to determine. Id.
However, the feelings of some in the community are portrayed by the fact that the
family suffered through numerous bomb threats, protests and an arson attempt on
their home before the county school board barred the infected brothers from class
attendance. Arcadia Harks Back to Days of Bone Mizell, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 3,
1992, at lA.
14. For a complete discussion of compulsory attendance laws, see infra notes
17-23 and accompanying text.
1312 [Vol. 39: p. 1309
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Supreme Court.1 5 Finally, this Comment will analyze the existing compul-
sory attendance laws of the fifty states and the District of Columbia.1 6
II. COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE LAWS
The Massachusetts Bay Colony established the first compulsory educa-
tion law in 1642.17 This law required parents to provide their children
with a fundamental education that included reading, religion and a
trade.18 It was not until 1852, however, that states began to mandate com-
pulsory public school attendance.1 9 The changing demographics of the
nation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led states to
require attendance at state public schools; instead of merely requiring an
education.2 0 Rapid urbanization, prompted by the industrial revolution
and mass immigration, resulted in the need to educate very large and di-
15. For a complete examination of the interests of parents and state govern-
ments in controlling the education of children, see infra notes 24-45 and accompa-
nying text.
16. For a complete analysis of the compulsory attendance laws of the fifty
states and the District of Columbia, see infra notes 174-235 and accompanying text.
17. LAWRENCE KOTIN & WILLIAM F. ArMAN, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPUL-
SORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 11 (1980) (citing Records of the Governor and Company of
Massachusetts Bay in New England, June 14, 1642, at 6-7).
18. Id. Local selectmen monitored whether parents were teaching their chil-
dren a trade and whether children were being taught to read and to understand
"the principles of religion and the capital lawes [sic] of this country." Id. (quoting
Records of the Governor and Company of Massachusetts Bay in New England, June 14,
1642, at 6). If the local selectmen determined that parents were not fulfilling their
obligations under the law, "the selectmen were required to remove the children
from parental custody and place them as apprentices with someone who would
carry out the law." Id.
19. Id. at 25. Massachusetts enacted the first compulsory attendance statute
in the United States, the Massachusetts School Attendance Act of 1852. Id. (citing
[Mass.] St. 1852, c.240, §§ 1, 2, 4). The Act required parents of children between
the ages of eight and fourteen to send such children to school for twelve weeks per
year, of which six weeks had to be consecutive. Id. By 1900, over 30 states and the
District of Columbia had enacted similar legislation. Id. at 25-26. The southern
states were slower to enact compulsory attendance statutes, but did so between
1900 and 1918. Id. at 26. Many of these southern state laws granted local counties,
cities and towns the option of implementing the legislation. Id.
20. See Kara T. Burgess, The Constitutionality of Home Education Statutes, 55
UMKC L. REv. 69, 70-71 (1986). From the 1830's to the 1920's, over 35 million
immigrants entered the United States, concentrating in the northern cities. See
THOMAS MULLER, IMMIGRANTS AND THE AMERICAN CrrY 69-70 (1993). In 1854
alone, nearly 500,000 immigrants arrived in the United States, representing almost
two percent of the existing population. See ROGER DANIELS, COMING TO AMERICA
124 (1990). This abundance of manpower, along with industrial advancement,
plentiful natural resources, an expanding domestic market, and an influx of for-
eign capital, produced dramatic growth in the northern urban centers. MULLER,
supra note 20, at 72-73. New York City's population rose from 200,000 in 1830 to
over one million in 1860 and approached seven million by the late 1920's. Id. at
73. By the start of the twentieth century, one-half of all male workers in New York
City and Chicago, the nation's two largest cities, were immigrants. Id.
5
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verse populations.21 Public schools were viewed as the most powerful
means of "promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic peo-
ple."22 As a result, nearly every state required public school attendance by
the end of World War 1.23
These laws had a dramatic impact on home schoolers and continue to
serve as a regulating source of home schools today. Although compulsory
attendance laws regulate home schooling, parents have a constitutional
interest in educating their children. This interest, however, often conflicts
with the state's interests in compulsory attendance.
III. CONSnTUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Several United States Supreme Court decisions have examined the
government's power to regulate education. 24 Although none of these
cases has dealt with what could be termed a "classic" home school, the
Court has set forth principles that are readily applicable to an analysis of
the constitutionality of compulsory attendance laws that prohibit or regu-
late home schooling.2 5 Ultimately, the Court has chosen to balance pa-
rental interests in home schooling against state interests in the education
of children, ignoring the interests of the child. 26
21. Burgess, supra note 20, at 70-71. The infusion of European immigrants
into the northern cities from 1820 to 1914 included approximately 5 million
Germans, 4.5 million Irish, 4.5 million Italians, 2.6 million Poles, 2.6 million Eng-
lish, and 2 million Jews, all of whose children would require an American educa-
tion. DANIELS, supra note 20, at 123 (map 2).
22. Burgess, supra note 20, at 71 (quoting McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
U.S. 203, 216 (1948)).
23. Burgess, supra note 20, at 70.
24. For further discussion of those United States Supreme Court cases exam-
ining the government's role in education, see infra notes 25-38 & 46-64 and ac-
companying text.
25. See, e.g., James C. Easterly, "Parent v. State:" The Challenge to Compulsory
School Attendance Laws, 11 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 83, 88 (1990) (recognizing
that "[e]ven though the [Supreme Court cases are] frequently cited for or against
the right of parents to educate their own children, none of those cases directly
addressed the issue of parental rights to educate their children at home");
Brendan Stocklin-Enright, The Constitutionality of Home Education: The Role of the Par-
ent, the State and the Child, 18 WII.AMErrE L. REv. 563, 564 (1982) (noting that "the
constitutional decisions of the United States courts ...do not provide an un-
clouded beacon to light our way, but without these cases there would be no consti-
tutional buttress whatsoever between the education choices of the family and of
the state").
26. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 459 (finding that "the Court has tended to
analyze these cases from the standpoint of parental interests versus state's interests
in a child's education"). To date, the Court has not included the interests of the
children in its constitutional analysis. Id. at 459-60. For the viewpoint that a
child's interest in his or her own education should be included in the Court's
analysis, see Ira C. Lupu, Home Education, Religious Liberty, and the Separation of Pow-
ers, 67 B.U. L. REv. 971, 976-80 (1987) (dismissing home schooling decisions that
focus only on interests of parents and state, and ignore interests of child, as "bilat-
eral and oppositional rhetoric"); McVicker, supra note 5, at 717-21 (arguing that
interests of child are not adequately represented either by interests of state or in-
1314 [Vol. 39: p. 1309
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A. State Interests
States have an undeniably strong interest in controlling education. As
early as 1925, the United States Supreme Court recognized the state inter-
est in education in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.2 17 In Pierce, the Court stated
that "[n]o question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably
to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them .... [and]
to require that all children of proper age attend some school."2 8 Thirty
years later, in Brown v. Board of Education,29 the Court recognized that "ed-
ucation is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of educa-
tion to our democratic society."3 0 Finally, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,3 ' the
Court stated that "[t] here is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a
high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regu-
lations for the control and duration of basic education."32
terests of parents, and that courts should focus upon best interests of child in-
volved); Stocldin-Enright, supra note 25, at 581-86 (contending that child's
interests in self-reliance, self-sufficiency and cultural viability require
safeguarding).
27. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Pierce involved a challenge to Oregon's Compulsory
Attendance Act, that required parents and guardians of children between eight
and sixteen years of age to send their children to the public school in their district.
Id. at 530. The Society of Sisters and Hill Military Academy, two incorporated pri-
vate schools located in the state, sought injunctions enjoining enforcement of the
Act, alleging that the Act conflicted with the right of parents to choose their chil-
dren's schools, the right of children to influence their parents' choice of school
and the right of schools and teachers to engage in a useful business or profession.
Id. at 531-33. The Court struck down the Act, holding that it constituted an arbi-
trary, unreasonable and unlawful interference with the schools' businesses and
properties. Id. at 535-36. For further discussion of Pierce, see infra note 28 and
accompanying text.
28. Id. at 534.
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. Id. at 493. In Brown, the Court explicitly rejected the "separate but equal"
doctrine of racial segregation in public schools, finding that intangible factors,
such as a feeling of inferiority among black students, render separate but equal
educational facilities inherently unequal and a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 493-96.
31. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
32. Id. at 213. In Yoder, Amish parents were convicted under Wisconsin's com-
pulsory attendance law for refusing to send their children to public or private
school after the children had graduated from the eighth grade. Id. at 207-08. The
Amish contended that high school attendance was contrary to the Amish religion
and that the compulsory attendance law violated their rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 208-09. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
the application of the compulsory attendance law violated the rights of the Amish
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Id. at 213. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute violated the Amish right
to free exercise of religion. Id. at 234-36. For further discussion of Yoder, see infra
notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
1994] COMMENT 1315
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The Yoder Court recognized two specific state interests in support of
compulsory education.3 3 First, states have an interest in ensuring that citi-
zens receive enough education to prepare them to participate effectively
in a democratic political system. 3 4 Second, states have an interest in citi-
zens receiving an education that will allow them to be self-sufficient mem-
bers of society. 35 Based upon the Court's acceptance of these state
interests, states have the constitutional authority to require the education
of children.3 6
Although the state interest in controlling education is strong, this in-
terest is not absolute. The state interest is subject to a balancing process
when it infringes upon the fundamental rights and interests of citizens.
These fundamental rights and interests are specifically protected by the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and "the traditional interest
of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children. 3 7
Also, parents have a right to control how their children are raised.3 8 To
survive constititional attack, the state interest must outweigh any such fun-
damental right or interest.
B. Parental Interests and Objections to Compulsory Attendance Laws
Two parental interests have formed the basis for the Court's limita-
tions on the state's powers to control education: the right of parents to
control the upbringing of their children and the right of parents to the
free exercise of religion.39 The right of parents to raise their children in
the manner of their choosing derives from the guarantee of liberty found
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.40 The right to
33. Id. at 221.
34. Id.
35. Id. In his concurring opinion in Yoder, Justice White offered a third state
interest, the interest of a state "not only in seeking to develop the latent talents of
its children but also in seeking to prepare them for the life style that they may later
choose, or at least to provide them with an option other than the life they have led
in the past." Id. at 240 (White, J., concurring).
36. See Baker, supra note 7, at 545 (noting that "constitutional decisions...
have recognized the states' 'compelling interest' in requiring schooling"); Patricia
M. Lines, Private Education Alternatives and State Regulation, 12 J.L. & EDuc. 189, 198
(1983) (stating that "[tihe basic premise [of compulsory attendance laws]-that
states have authority to require education for children-is widely conceded");
Stocklin-Enright, supra note 25, at 578 (stating that "[c]learly... the state has a
vital interest in ensuring that its citizens are educated to an adequate level en-
abling them to operate the machinery of state").
37. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating that "[w]ithout
doubt, [the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment] denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual ... to
marry, establish a home and bring up children"). For further discussion of the
parent's rights under Due Process Clause, see infra notes 46-83 and accompanying
text.
1316 (Vol. 39: p. 1309
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freedom from government interference in the exercise of religion arises
from the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.41 Additionally,
parents have other grounds to challenge compulsory attendance statutes,
including vagueness, 42 lack of a neutral, detached magistrate, 43 a violation
of the Establishment Clause, 44 or an equal protection violation under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 45
1. Due Process: Parental Fundamental Right or Mere Liberty Interest?
The Court first indicated that state interests in education were subject
to limitation by a parent's right to due process in Meyer v. Nebraska.46 In
Meyer, a tutor was convicted under a Nebraska statute that prohibited
teaching any foreign language to a student who had not yet reached the
eighth grade. 47 In holding that the statute violated the tutor's right to
teach under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court also suggested that
the Due Process guarantee of liberty protected the parents' right to em-
ploy a teacher to instruct their children in the German language.48 The
Court defined this guarantee of liberty to include "the right of the individ-
ual . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up children."49 Although
Nebraska had the power to compel school attendance and reasonably reg-
41. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof." Id. For further discussion of the Free Exercise
Clause, see infra notes 84-127 and accompanying text.
42. For further discussion of vagueness challenges, see infra notes 128-45 and
accompanying text.
43. It is unconstitutional to permit persons with unbridled discretion, such as
school superintendents, to make decisions affecting the exercise of fundamental
rights. See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939). For
further discussion of lack of a neutral, detached magistrate, see infra notes 146-57
and accompanying text.
44. For further discussion of the Establishment Clause, see infra notes 158-64
and accompanying text.
45. For further discussion of the Equal Protection Clause, see infra notes 165-
73 and accompanying text.
46. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Meyer, the Court stated that "[t]he problem for
our determination is whether the statute [prohibiting foreign language instruction
to children in grades eight and below] ... unreasonably infringes the liberty guar-
anteed.., by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 399. After attempting to define
the liberties granted under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court, in dicta, de-
clared that the parents' right to employ a foreign language instructor was within
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 400.
47. Id. at 396-97.
48. Id. at 400 (stating that "the right of parents to engage [a language
teacher] to instruct their children... [is] within the liberty of the amendment").
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent
part: "No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
49. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
1994] COMMENT 1317
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ulate school affairs,50 the Court found the statute to be unrelated to any
valid state purpose51 and to violate the parents' liberty interest in directing
their children's education. 52
Two years after Meyer, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,53 the Court struck
down an Oregon compulsory attendance statute requiring parents to send
their children to public school.54 The statute, which the Court feared
would eliminate all of the private schools in the state,5 5 was found to inter-
fere unreasonably with the liberty of parents to direct the upbringing and
education of their children.5 6 The Court emphasized that the Oregon
statute did not possess even a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state
objective, adding that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State;
those who nurture him [or her] and direct his [or her] destiny have the
50. Id. at 402. According to the Court, "[t]he power of the State to compel
attendance at some school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools, in-
cluding a requirement that they shall give instructions in English, is not ques-
tioned." Id.
51. Id. at 403. In fact, the Court specifically concluded that "the Statute as
applied is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the compe-
tency of the State." Id.
52. Id. at 400. The Court's finding that the Nebraska statute violated the par-
ents' liberty interest in directing their children's education is, however, clearly
dicta. See Easterly, supra note 25, at 86-87 (noting that because parents were not
parties to action in Meyer, Court's holding could not be based upon rights of par-
ents to educate their children, but rather was based on tutor's substantive right to
pursue legitimate business or profession).
53. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
54. Id. at 534-35. In Pierce, Society of Sisters, a private corporation designed
"to care for orphans, educate and instruct the youth, establish and maintain acade-
mies or schools, and acquire necessary real and personal property," established
schools that provided both secular and religious educations. Id. at 531-32. Prior to
the enactment of the statute, the corporation had profited from parents who had
chosen to send their children to its schools. Id. at 532. The compulsory education
statute, however, resulted in a reduction in corporate revenue because many par-
ents were forced to withdraw their children from the corporation's schools and
place them in public schools. Id. Thus, Society of Sisters alleged that the Oregon
compulsory education statute conflicts with the rights of parents to choose schools
where their children will receive appropriate mental and religious training, the
right of the child to influence the parents' choice of a school, the right of schools
and teachers therein to engage in a useful business or profession, and is accord-
ingly repugnant to the Constitution and void. Id.
55. Id. at 534. The statute required every parent and guardian having custody
of a child between the ages of eight and sixteen years to send the child to a public
school in the district where the child resides. Id. at 530. Noncompliance with the
statute was punishable as a misdemeanor. Id. The statute provided exemptions
for children "who are not normal, or who have completed the eighth grade, or
who reside at considerable distances from any public school, or whose parents or
guardians hold special permits." Id. at 530-31.
56. Id. at 534-35. However, because the appellees in the case, including the
Society of Sisters, were corporations, they could not claim the protections of the
liberty guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 535. The Court nonethe-
less ruled in favor of the appellees, holding that the Oregon statute constituted an
arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful interference with appellees' business and
property. Id. at 535-36.
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right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him [or her]
for additional obligations."5 7 Since 1925, when Pierce provided parents
who send their children to private schools with an exemption from com-
pulsory public school attendance, no state has attempted such a direct
attack on private schools.58
Another case of this period, Farrington v. Tokushige,59 involved a Ha-
waii statute that regulated private schools to such a degree that they would
be nearly indistinguishable from public schools. 60 The Hawaii statute reg-
ulated teacher qualifications, curricula, textbooks, entrance requirements
and languages spoken in the state's private foreign language schools. 6 1
The Court stated that such interference went beyond "mere regulation"
and impermissibly burdened the parents' right to direct their children's
education without unreasonable restrictions. 62
57. Id. at 535.
58. See Lines, supra note 36, at 198 (stating that "no state has launched a simi-
lar, direct attack on private schools" since decision in Pierce).
59. 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
60. Id. at 298. In Farrington, members of numerous voluntary unincorporated
associations conducting foreign language schools for instruction of Japanese chil-
dren in the Territory of Hawaii sought and obtained an injunction prohibiting the
enforcement of a Hawaiian statute that severely regulated the Territory's Japanese
speaking schools. Id. at 290-91. The United States Supreme Court, affirming the
decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, upheld the injunction on the
grounds that the statute unreasonably regulated the Territory's private schools and
placed unreasonable restrictions on the right of parents to direct the education of
their children. Id. at 298-99. The Court stated that enforcement of the statute,
that gave "affirmative direction concerning the intimate and essential details" of
the Territory's private schools, would likely "destroy most, if not all," of the Japa-
nese speaking private schools targeted by the Act. Id.
61. Id. at 293-95. The Act provided, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person shall
teach in a foreign language school unless and until he shall have first applied to
and obtained a permit so to do." Id. at 293. No such permit would be granted
"unless and until the department [of public instruction] is satisfied that the appli-
cant.., is possessed of the ideals of democracy; knowledge of American history
and institutions, and knows how to read, write and speak the English language."
Id. The Act further provided that no student may "attend any foreign language
school for more than one hour each day, nor exceeding six hours in any one
week," and granted the Department of Public Instruction the power "to prescribe
by regulations the subjects and courses of study of all foreign language schools,
and the entrance and attendance prerequisites or qualifications .... and the text-
books used in any foreign language school." Id. at 294.
62. Id. at 298-99. Because the plaintiffs in Farrington were not the parents but
rather the affected schools, the Court's holding must rest upon the statute's denial
of school owners the reasonable choice and discretion of how to operate their
schools. Id. at 298. The Court is not clear about the basis for its holding, however,
stating simply that the statute violates the Fifth Amendment's prohibition, applica-
ble to territorial governments, against depriving any person of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law. Id. at 299. In dicta however, the Court appears to
address the effect of this statute on parental liberties as well as the rights of owners.
See id. (stating that statute "would deprive parents of fair opportunity to procure
for their children instruction which they think important" and affirming fact that
"[a] Japanese parent has the right to direct the education of his own child without
unreasonable restrictions").
11
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Thus, while the Supreme Court has never specifically held that par-
ents have a fundamental right to educate their children in a home school,
the relevant language of the case law can easily be interpreted to suggest
that parents do indeed possess this right, subject to reasonable regulation
by the state. 63 In fact, most commentators take this-view, arguing that the
parent's interests should be afforded strict scrutiny, and that only a com-
pelling state interest can outweigh this parental right.64
Courts, however, generally have balked at recognizing a fundamental
parental right to direct their children's education. 65 Most recently, the
63. See Easterly, supra note 25, at 86 (finding that Supreme Court has clearly
not yet addressed issue of whether parents have fundamental right to educate their
children at home). The Court, however, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205(1972), has cited approval of both Meyer and Pierce. Id at 232-34. Although the
holding of Yoder is limited to religious objections to compulsory school attendance,
the Court, noted that the case involved the fundamental interests of parents to
guide the education of their children. Id. at 232. The Court observed that "[the]
primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established
beyond debate as an American tradition." Id. For a brief discussion of the facts of
Yoder, see supra note 32. For further discussion of religious objections to compul-
sory school attendance and the impact of Yoder, see infra notes 89-101 and accom-
panying text.
64. See, e.g., Burgess, supra note 20, at 74-75 (arguing that "[t]he Supreme
Court decisions . . .reflect a consistent recognition of parental privacy interests
and fundamental rights in the education of children"); Alma C. Henderson, The
Home Schooling Movement: Parents Take Control of Educating Their Children, ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 985, 992 (1991) (concluding that Supreme Court's decisions suggest that
Fourteenth Amendment protects parental right to teach children at home);
Branton G. Lachman, Comment, Home Education and Fundamental Rights: Can
Johnny's Parents Teach Johnny?, 18 W. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 742 (1991) (observing that
"[iut appears that parental liberty regarding education is a fundamental right");
Murphy, supra note 2, at 471 (contending that Court's language in Pierce, Meyer,
Farrington and Yoder demonstrates Court recognition of the fundamental right of
arents to direct the education of their children); Smith & Klicka, supra note 4, at
19 (asserting that "[i]t is beyond dispute that parents have a fundamental right to
direct the education and upbringing of their children that supersedes the State's
limited interest in regulating education"); Dwight E. Tompkins, An Argument for
Privacy in Support of the Choice of Home Education by Parents, 20J.L. & EDUC. 301, 308-
11 (1991) (proposing that reasonable construction of Supreme Court decisions
supports fundamental right of privacy protecting parental choice of home
education).
For the view that Supreme Court decisions do not clearly recognize such a
right, see Devins, supra note 9, at 823 (finding that Supreme Court decisions pro-
vide no clear guidance); Lupu, supra note 26, at 974 (discussing judicial question-
ing of validity of Meyer, Pierce and Farrington).
65. See, e.g., Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1043 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding
no fundamental right of parents to supervise their children's education); Null v.
Board of Educ., 815 F. Supp. 937, 939-40 (S.D. W. Va. 1993) (finding that parents
do not possess fundamental right to direct their children's education, but rather
only general liberty interest subject to reasonable state regulation); Hinrichs v.
Whitburn, 772 F. Supp. 423, 432 (W.D. Wis. 1991) (finding no cases recognizing
existence of fundamental right of parents to direct their children's education and
concluding right at issue is merely liberty interest subject to reasonable state regu-
lation), aff'd 975 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1992); Clonlara, Inc. v. Runkel, 722 F. Supp.
1442, 1458 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (concluding that parental interest in directing chil-
1320 [Vol. 39: p. 1309
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Michigan Supreme Court rejected such a claim in People v. Bennett.66 In
Bennett, parents who were instructing their children in a home school were
convicted under Michigan's compulsory education laws.6 7 The parents
challenged the convictions arguing that the Michigan law, that requires all
teachers to be state certified, unconstitutionally infringed upon their fun-
damental right as parents to direct the education of their children. 68 The
court, however, refused to classify the parental interest as a fundamental
right, instead upholding the certification requirement under the "minimal
scrutiny" test.6 9
dren's education is not fundamental and therefore subject to reasonable state reg-
ulation); Hanson v. Cushman, 490 F. Supp. 109, 112-15 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (same);
Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452, 461 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (holding
that home schoolers had established no fundamental right abridged by state com-
pulsory attendance law); In re Sawyer, 672 P.2d 1093, 1097-98 (Kan. 1983) (finding
that parents have no fundamental right to direct children's education); Care &
Protection of Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592, 599 (Mass. 1987) (finding that although
parents possess basic right in-directing education of their children, "such a right is
not absolute [and] must be reconciled with substantial State interest in the educa-
tion of its citizenry"); People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106, 111-15 (Mich. 1993)
(finding no cases recognizing existence of fundamental right of parents to direct
their children's education and concluding that parental interest therefore not sub-
ject to strict scrutiny standard but subject to reasonable regulation by state); State
v. DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254, 274 (Vt. 1990) (concluding that parental right to
direct children's education is not absolute and is subject to reasonable state regula-
tion). But see State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750, 768-69 (Ohio 1976) (" [i] t has long
been recognized that the right of a parent to guide the education ... of his or her
children is indeed a 'fundamental right' guaranteed by the Due process clause
[sic] of the Fourteenth Amendment.")
66. 501 N.W.2d 106 (Mich. 1993).
67. Id. at 108. Michigan's compulsory attendance law requires that "every par-
ent . . . having control and charge of a child from the age of 6 to the child's
sixteenth birthday, shall send that child to the public schools during the entire
school year." MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 380.1561(1) (West 1992). An exception is
provided for any child "who is attending regularly and is being taught in a state
approved nonpublic school, which teaches subjects comparable to those taught in
the public schools to children of corresponding age and grade." Id.
§ 380.1561(3)(a). The Act further provides that "[n]o person shall teach or give
instruction ... in any private, denominational or parochial school within this state
who does not hold a certificate such as would qualify him or her to teach in like
grades of the public schools of the state." Id. § 388.553.
68. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d at 111. Because the parents' decision to educate their
children at home was motivated by dissatisfaction with the public school system,
and was not based on any religious belief, the parents did not raise any religious
objections to the statute. Id. at 108.
69. Id. at 115-16. The minimal scrutiny test requires only that the statute in
question be reasonably related to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 116. The court
found that Michigan had a legitimate state interest in "ensuring the minimum
competence of those entrusted to teach." Id. The court then found that the stat-
ute's teacher certification requirement was reasonably related to this interest. Id.
at 116-17.
As noted byJustice Riley, the court's analysis is flawed because it misidentifies
the "legitimate state interest" at issue. Id. at 124-26 (Riley, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). If Michigan's interest is viewed simply as an interest in
ensuring the education of all children, the state teacher certification requirement
13
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In reaching its decision, the court first addressed the parents' conten-
tion that Pierce and Meyer recognized a parent's interest in their children's
education as a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment.70
The court interpreted Pierce on two levels.7 1 In a broad sense, the court
found Pierce to provide parents with the right to choose either public or
private schools for their children.72 In a narrow sense, the court viewed
Pierce "as providing parents the right to direct the religious education of
their children. 7 3 The court found "[iun no sense, however, has Pierce
been interpreted to mean that parents have a fundamental right to direct
all of their children's education decisions."74 The court then dismissed
Meyer as a case that "may have made one general statement concerning
parental rights to control their children's education," but did not grant
parents freedom from reasonable state regulation.75
The Michigan court, while not alone in its explicit rejection of the
parental fundamental right,76 does distinguish itself from other courts
does not bear even a reasonable relationship with the state's interest. See id. at 125
(Riley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Michigan's teacher certifica-
tion requirement is not reasonably related to educational achievement, but is
merely an attempt to standardize its children by forcing students to accept instruc-
tion only from state-approved teachers."). Justice Riley noted that this is particu-
larly true where, as in Bennett, the state failed to produce any evidence that the
children were receiving an inadequate education at home or that there was "a
correlation between the teacher certification requirement and [the] educational
achievement" of the children. Id. at 125-26 (Riley, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
70. Id. at 112-15. The parents also argued that the language of Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), supported their claim to possession of a fundamental
right to direct their children's education. Id. at 112-13. The court quickly rejected
this claim, interpreting Yoder as purely a First Amendment case and as such, unre-
lated to the issue of fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
113. For a brief discussion of the facts of Yoder, see supra note 32. For further
discussion of the relationship between Yoder, Meyer and Pierce, see supra note 63.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division, Dept.
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute
as stated in Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), also cited by the
parents as reaffirming the parental fundamental right to direct their children's
education, was similarly dismissed by the Michigan Supreme Court as primarily a
First Amendment case. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d at 114. For a further discussion of
Smith, see infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
71. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d at 112.
72. Id.
73. Id. The court, noting that the discussion in Pierce of parental rights is
essentially dicta, conceded that Pierce is better known for its discussion of parental
rights than for its actual holding that was based upon property rights. Id. at 112
n.17. For a further discussion of Pierce, see supra notes 27-28, 53-58 and accompa-
nying text.
74. Id. at 112.
75. Id. at 113. The court also noted that because the defendant in Meyer was a
teacher, not a parent, any discussion of parental rights was "dicta at best." Id. at
113 n.23.
76. See, e.g., Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F.Supp. 452, 461 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (finding that parents challenging Illinois compulsory attendance statute,
1322 [Vol. 39: p. 1309
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with the clarity of its analysis. Several courts have avoided concrete analy-
sis of the issue of whether parents possess a fundamental right to direct
their children's education; instead they merely parrot the United States
Supreme Court's language.7 7 For example, the Alabama Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals did this in State v. Jernigan.78
In Jernigan, the parents instructing their children in a home school
violated Alabama's compulsory attendance law because the wife did not
possess a state teacher's license, violating the statutory definition of a pri-
vate tutor.79 The parents claimed, among other grounds, that the law vio-
lated their fundamental parental liberty.8 0 The court, rather than
expressly ruling on the existence of such a fundamental right, simply
quoted the language of Meyer, Pierce and Yoder and held that a state may
impose such reasonable regulations upon education. 8 1 The court made
no attempt either to flesh out the relative weight of the competing inter-
ests or to define the limits of what is reasonable. 82 For this reason,Jernigan
and cases like it offer limited guidance to parents who wish to home
school.
Given thejudiciary's often harsh and occasionally muddled treatment
of the parental right to teach their children at home, parents can have
little confidence that their interest in directing their children's education
will overcome compulsory attendance statutes. The viability of parental
right claims may well increase in the future, but for the moment, their
effectiveness is limited to the realm of religious instruction.8 3
that effectively barred home schools, had not established that a fundamental right
had been abridged by statute). For other decisions also explicitly rejecting the
parental fundamental right, see supra note 65.
77. See, e.g., State v. Jernigan, 412 So. 2d 1242, 1246-47 (Ala. Crim. App.
1982) (citing Meyer, Pierce and Yoder but failing to clearly decide issue of existence
of fundamental parental right to direct children's education); People v. Turner,
263 P.2d 685, 687-88 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1953) (quoting Pierce but failing
to determine whether parents have fundamental right to direct their children's
education), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1954); State v. McDonough, 468 A.2d
977, 979-80 (Me. 1987) (quoting Pierce and Yoderbut failing to clearly state whether
parents possess fundamental right in directing their children's education).
78. 412 So. 2d 1242 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982).
79. Id. at 1243-44.
80. Id. at 1246. The parents also contended that the law violated their free-
dom of religion and was overbroad. Id. at 1244, 1247. The parents claimed that
the law violated their freedom of religion because it compelled them to send their
children to a public school, in violation of their religious beliefs. Id. at 1242.
81. Id. at 1246-47.
82. See id. at 1246 (stating broadly that "[a] state's power to require basic edu-
cation of its citizens in order to promote legitimate state interests is undisputedly
recognized").
83. See People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106, 114-15 (Mich. 1993) (stating that
case law "recognize[s] the choice of a home school as protected under a parent's
fundamental right, but only under the fundamental right to direct a child's reli-
gious education"). For a further discussion of the role of parental rights claims in
the free exercise of religion, see infra notes 84-127 and accompanying text.
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2. Free Exercise, of Religion
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof. '8 4  The Free Exercise Clause protects
parents whose religious beliefs are burdened by state compulsory school
attendance laws. 85 In Sherbert v. Verner,86 the Supreme Court established a
test for determining whether a state law impermissibly burdens an individ-
ual's free exercise of his or her religious beliefs. 87 Under the Sherbert test,
a state law that burdens an individual's ability to exercise sincerely-held
religious beliefs is unconstitutional unless it furthers a compelling state
interest and no less restrictive alternative form of regulation exists that
would further the state's interest. 88
Building on Sherbert, the Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder applied a Free
Exercise Clause analysis to the Wisconsin compulsory attendance law.8 9 In
Yoder, Amish parents sought relief from a law that would require them to
send their children to formal schools beyond the eighth grade, in viola-
tion of Amish religious beliefs.9 0 The Court focused on the sincerity of
84. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment is made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927)
(finding Kansas statute punishing advocation of "criminal syndicalism"
unconstitutional).
85. See Smith & Klicka, supra note 4, at 311 (observing that religiously moti-
vated parents may assert free exercise of religion defense).
86. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
87. Id. at 403-09. In Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church
was discharged by her employer because she would not work on Saturdays, the
Sabbath Day of her faith. Id. at 399. When she was unable to obtain other employ-
ment due to her refusal to work on Saturdays, she filed a claim for state unemploy-
ment benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act. Id. at
399-400. The Act provided that a claimant is ineligible for benefits if the claimant
has failed, without good cause, to accept available suitable work when offered. Id.
at 400. The state Employment Security Commission denied the applicant's claim
on the ground that she would not accept suitable work when offered. Id. at 401. Its
action was sustained by the South Carolina Supreme Court. Id. The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the South Carolina statute, as applied, vio-
lated the applicant's First Amendment right to the free exercise of her religion,
made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 401-10.
88. Id. at 406-09.
89. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-36. The Wisconsin compulsory attendance law
rovided, in pertinent part: "Unless the child has a legal excuse or has graduated
From high school, any person having under his [or her] control a child who is
between the ages of 7 and 16 years shall cause such child to attend school regularly
during the full period and hours, religious holidays excepted, that the public or
private school in which such child should be enrolled is in session .... " Id. at 207
(quoting Wis. STAT. § 118.15(1) (a) (1969)). Exceptions were granted for children
who were physically or mentally unable to attend school and for children receiving
instruction elsewhere that was approved by the state superintendent as substan-
tially equivalent to the instruction available in the local public or private schools.
Id. (quoting Wis. STAT. § 118.15(3), (4) (1969)).
90. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207-09. The Amish believed that, by sending their chil-
dren to high school, "they would not only expose themselves to the danger of the
1324 [Vol. 39: p. 1309
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the Amish beliefs, 91 the significant burden the state law placed on these
beliefs, 92 the particular characteristics of the Amish culture and the lack of
a compelling state interest 93 held that the law, as applied to the Amish,
was unconstitutional.94
A four point test for evaluating free exercise claims emerged from
Yoder and its progency.95 First, the individual must have a sincere religious
belief.96 Second, this belief must be burdened by a state regulation.97
Third, the state must have a compelling interest in maintaining the law.98
Fourth, the state must have chosen the least restrictive means of achieving
its goal. 99 Thus, under the Yoder test, even if the first two elements are
censure of the church community, but... also [would] endanger their own salva-
tion and that of their children." Id. at 209.
91. Id. at 216-17. The Court found that the record in the case "abundantly
support[ed]" the claim that the Amish way of life was not merely a matter of per-
sonal preference based upon philosophical beliefs, but rather was a matter of deep
religious conviction. Id. at 216. The Court noted the intimate, if not'dominant,
role of religion in Amish daily life, as well as the unchanging nature of this lifestyle
in a period of "unparalleled progress" in the outside world, as evidence of the
sincerity of the Amish beliefs. Id. at 216-17. In fact, the state stipulated that the
religious beliefs of the Amish were sincere. Id. at 209.
92. Id. at 217-19. The Court concluded by stating that: [S]econdary school-
ing, by exposing Amish children to worldly influences in terms of attitudes, goals,
and values contrary to beliefs, and by substantially interfering with the religious
development of the Amish child and his integration into the way of life of the
Amish faith community at the crucial adolescent stage of development, contra-
venes the basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith, both as to the
parent and the child. Id. at 218.
93. Id. at 221-29. The Court stressed the continued success and self-suffi-
ciency of the Amish community, and the tendency for nearly all Amish children to
remain in the community throughout their lives. Id. at 222-24. In view of these
characteristics, the Court determined that an additional one or two years of formal
education would do little to serve the state's interests in preparing its citizens to
participate effectively in a democratic political system and in ensuring a self-reliant
and self-sufficient populace. Id. at 221-22.
94. Id. at 235-36.
95. See Lines, supra note 36, at 200-01 (summarizing test for evaluating free
exercise claims under Yoder and its progeny).
96. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-17. The Court emphasized that, to warrant the pro-
tection of the Religion Clauses, a claim must be rooted in religious belief. Id. at
215. Purely secular considerations are not protected by the Religion Clauses. Id.
at 215-16.
97. Id. at 217-19. In Yoder, the state compulsory attendance law severely bur-
dened the Amish religious beliefs, forcing the Amish to choose between complying
with the law and abandoning their religious beliefs, not complying with the law
and facing possible criminal sanctions, or migrating to a more tolerant region. Id.
at 218-19. The Court found that the law "would gravely endanger if not destroy"
the Amish right to free exercise of their religious beliefs. Id. at 219.
98. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963) (stating that Court "must
next consider whether some compelling state interest ... justifies the substantial
infringement of appellant's First Amendment right").
99. Id. at 407-09 (stating that "it [is] incumbent upon [the state] to demon-
strate that no alternative forms of regulation would [meet the state's goal] without
infringing First Amendment rights").
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present, the law does not unconstitutionally infringe on an individual's
religious freedom if both the third and fourth elements are satisfied.100
Generally, courts applying the test merely weigh the individual's interest in
the free exercise of religion against the state's interest in ensuring an edu-
cated citizenry.' 0 1
The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Rule 10.2(c)
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 0 2
however, modifies the use of the Sherbert and Yoder tests.' 0 3 Under Smith, a
law that only incidentally infringes on the free exercise of religion is fully
enforceable, regardless of the burden it may place on an individual's reli-
gious beliefs.' 0 4 Therefore, any generally applicable, neutral state law will
survive a free exercise claim, unless the claim is offered "in conjunction
with other constitutional protections, such as... the right of parents ... to
direct the education of their children."' 0 5
100. See Kathleen P. Kelly, Abandoning the Compelling Interest Test in Free Exercise
Cases: Employment Division, Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 40 CATH. U. L.
REv. 929, 930 (1991) (stating that "[o]nce the plaintiffs demonstrate that they hold
a sincere religious belief, the Court will exempt them from the legislation unless
the government can prove both that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest and that the law is the 'least restrictive means' available to achieve
that objective"); Lines, supra note 36, at 200-01 (stating that if court finds signifi-
cant burden placed on sincerely held religious belief, court next must consider
whether state has compelling justification for its law and whether it has chosen
least restrictive means of achieving its goals); Smith and Klicka, supra note 4, at
311-13 (stating that once parents meet burden under first two prongs of test, law is
deemed unconstitutional unless state meets its burden under final two prongs of
test).
101. See Lines, supra note 36, at 201 (concluding that, in analysis of free exer-
cise claims, courts generally balance interest of individual in free exercise of reli-
gion against interest of state in educated citizenry).
102. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) superseded by statute as stated in Campos v. Couglin,
854 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). For a discussion of how the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act will have little impact on home schools to make free exercise argu-
ments, see infra note 127 and accompanying text.
103. Id. at 876-82. In Smith, two employees of a private drug rehabilitation
organization were fired because they ingested peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, for
sacramental purposes at a ceremony of their Native American Church. Id. at 874.
Their applications for unemployment compensation were denied by the State of
Oregon under a state law disqualifying employees discharged for work-related mis-
conduct. Id. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the denial of
benefits violated the applicants' free exercise rights. Id. The Oregon Supreme
Court affirmed. Id. The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and
remanded for a determination whether sacramental peyote use is proscribed by
the state's controlled substance law. Id. at 875-76. On remand, the Oregon
Supreme Court held that sacramental peyote use was prohibited by the state stat-
ute, but concluded that the prohibition was invalid under the Free Exercise
Clause. Id. at 876. The United States Supreme Court again reversed, holding that
the Free Exercise Clause permits a state to proscribe sacramental peyote use and
thus to deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for its use. Id. at 876-
90.
104. Id. at 876-82.
105. Id. at 881 (citations omitted).
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Given the language of Smith, commentators agree that free exercise
arguments remain available to religiously motivated home schoolers, even
in the face of neutral, generally applicable state compulsory attendance
laws. 10 6 Because all home school cases involve the right of parents to di-
rect the education of their children, free exercise issues necessarily arise.
Therefore, courts must apply strict scrutiny even if the challenged law only
indirectly affects the parents' religious freedom.
The recent Michigan Supreme Court decision in People v. DeJonge'0 7
demonstrates the treatment of free exercise claims by home schoolers af-
ter Smith.'0 8 In Deonge, parents who taught their children at home with-
out complying with a state certification requirement were convicted under
Michigan's compulsory attendance law.1°9 The parents contended that
the certification requirement violated their First Amendment right of free
exercise of religion. n 0 Citing Smith, the court ruled that the parents' free
exercise claim, in conjunction with the parental right to direct their chil-
dren's education, demanded the application of strict scrutiny.' Follow-
ing the Yoder test, the court initially found that the parents possessed a
sincere religious belief 12 and that the state regulation imposed a burden
on this belief." 3 The court then attempted to determine whether a com-
106. See Dorman, supra note 3, at 743 (stating that "lilt... remains clear that
where the free exercise of religion - accompanied by another 'constitutional pro-
tection[ ]' - is infringed directly or indirectly, courts must apply strict scrutiny");
Murphy, supra note 2, at 467-68 (suggesting four approaches for use of free exer-
cise claim after Smith: alleging statute is not generally applicable, alleging statute is
not religiously neutral, combining free exercise claim with another constitutionally
based claim or seeking religious exemptions through political process).
Recent legislation purports to restore the compelling interest test as it existed
before Smith. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000bb (Law Co-op. 1994) [hereinafter Religious
Freedom Restoration Act]. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act reestablishes
the requirement that government must have a compelling interest to substantially
interfere with religious exercise. Id. To date, at least one court has found that
Smith is superseded by the Act. Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194, 204
(S.D.N.Y. 1994). For a discussion of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, see
Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FoRDH
L. REv. 883 (1994).
107. 501 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1993).
108. Id. at 134-43.
109. Id. at 129-30. For the text of the Michigan compulsory attendance stat-
ute, see supra note 67.
110. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d at 131. The parents also maintained that the certifi-
cation requirement infringed upon their Fourteenth Amendment right to direct
the education of their children. Id. at 130 n.5. However, the court did not reach
that issue in the case. Id.
111. Id. at 134-35.
112. Id. at 135. The court accepted the findings of the trial judge that the
certification requirement conflicted with the honest and sincere religious beliefs
of the parents. Id. at 130.
113. Id. at 136-37. According to the court, "[a] burden may be shown if the
'affected individuals [would] be coerced by the Government's action into violating
their religious beliefs [or whether] government action [would] penalize religious
activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges
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pelling state interest justified this burden. 114 Because the state failed to
show that the certification requirement was essential to promote the
state's interest in universal education, the court found that the state's in-
terest in the certification requirement was not compelling.11 5 Further-
more, the court found that less restrictive alternatives to the certification
requirement were available.1 16 Because the state failed to meet the final
two elements of the test, the court held that the teacher certification re-
quirement was an unconstitutional violation of the Free Exercise Clause,
as applied to parents whose religious convictions prohibited the use of
certified teachers. 117
A key distinction exists between Dejonge and cases in which free exer-
cise challenges by home schoolers have failed: the court's characterization
of the state's interest. When the court views the interest pursued by the
state as being in the method or manner of education as in Dejonge, the
court is unlikely to find this state interest to be compelling. 118 However,
when the court characterizes the state's interest as ensuring that all chil-
dren receive an adequate education, the court will almost certainly con-
sider this interest compelling.11 9
The Dejonge analysis appears to be the better of the two approaches
because it recognizes that the state, in most cases, is not contending that a
enjoyed by other citizens.'" Id. at 136 (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Ceme-
tery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988)). The court then concluded that
the Michigan law, that forced the parents to choose between violating the law of
God or the law of man, represented a burden on the exercise of the parents' reli-
gious freedom. Id. at 137.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 137-41. The court found that the "nearly universal consensus" of
the other states is not to demand teacher certification, and that this fact "provides
irrefutable evidence that the certification requirement is not an interest worthy of
being deemed 'compelling.'" Id. at 141.
116. Id. at 140-43. The court emphasized that the appellate court had errone-
ously placed the burden of proof upon the parents. Id. at 143. The burden is not
upon citizens to propose a less obtrusive alternative, it is upon the state to show
that no such alternatives exist. Id. at 143-44. The court noted, however, that indi-
vidualized, standardized achievement tests represented one possible alternative for
monitoring the education of home school students. Id. at 141 n.52; see also State ex
rel. Nagel v. Olin, 415 N.E.2d 279, 286-88 (Ohio 1980) (holding that state board of
education standards were not least restrictive alternative and therefore unconstitu-
tionally burdened parent's free exercise right to send daughter to Amish school).
117. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d at 144.
118. Id. at 139.
119. See, e.g., New Life Baptist Church Academy v. Town of E. Longmeadow,
885 F.2d 940, 944-45 (1st Cir. 1989) (determining that state had compelling inter-
est in education of all citizens in evaluation of free exercise challenge to state com-
pulsory attendance law), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990); Murphy v. Arkansas, 852
F.2d 1039, 1041-43 (8th Cir. 1988) (same); Blount v. Department of Educ. & Cul-
tural Serv., 551 A.2d 1377, 1381-82 (Me. 1988) (same); In re Welfare of T.K., 475
N.W.2d 88, 92 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (same); State v. Patzer, 382 N.W.2d 631, 636
(N. D.) (same), cert denied, 479 U.S. 825 (1986); State v. DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254,
263-64 (Vt. 1990) (same).
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particular home school is not providing an adequate education.' 2 0 If a
home school is competently educating the children, the state interest in
the education of children is satisfied. Therefore, the actual state interest
in such a situation is in controlling the manner of education, such as de-
manding that all teachers be certified. 12 1 This interest should be deemed
compelling, only if it is essential to meeting the overall goal of ensuring
that all children within the state receive an adequate education.' 22
Apart from the court's characterization of the state's interest, home
schoolers may also encounter problems when challenging provisions of
compulsory attendance laws that courts view as too minor to significantly
infringe upon the free exercise of religion: For example, courts have sum-
marily dismissed free exercise challenges to state statutes requiring that
home schoolers obtain pre-approval of any home instruction program,
reasoning that approval requirements represent the least restrictive means
of fulfilling the state's compelling interest.' 23 When the government in-
terference is more significant, however, free exercise claims may prove to
be an effective defense for religiously motivated parents.
It should be noted that recent legislation may render any Smith analy-
sis moot.' 2 4 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1994 purports to
restore the compelling interest test as it existed before Smith.125 The Act
re-establishes the requirement that government must have a compelling
interest to substantially interfere with-the free exercise of religion.' 26 Be-
cause Smith does not adversely affect the ability of home schoolers to make
120. See DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d at 130 (noting that "the prosecution never ques-
tioned the adequacy of the [parents'] instruction or the education the children
received"). For a discussion of the level of educational achievement of home
school students, see supra note 12.
121. See id. at 139. In describing the state's interest in a teacher certification
requirement, the Michigan Supreme Court stated that "the state's interest is simply
the certification requirement .... not the general objectives of compulsory educa-
tion. The interest the state pursues is in the manner of education, not its goals."
Id.; see also Care & Protection of Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592, 600 (Mass. 1987) (deter-
mining that state's interest cannot lie in ensuring "that the educational process be
dictated in its minutest detail"); People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106, 124 (Mich.
1993) (Riley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that "a careful
examination of the state interest in the instant case reveals that it is not compul-
sory education per se, but the manner of education").
122. See DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d at 140 (stating that "[t]he state.., must establish
that enforcing the certification requirement ... is essential to ensure the educa-
tion required by the compulsory education law").
123. See, e.g., New Life Baptist Church, 885 F.2d at 944-51 (finding that state has
compelling interest in pre-approval of private religious schools and that such ap-
proval constitutes least restrictive means of fulfilling this interest); Blount, 551 A.2d
at 1379-85 (same).
124. See Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding
that Religious Freedom Restoration Act supersedes Smith).
125. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000bb (Law. Co-Op. 1994). For a discussion of the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act, see Laycock, supra note 106.
126. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000bb (Law. Co-op. 1994).
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free exercise arguments, however, the enactment of such legislation
should have little impact on home schoolers. 127
3. Vagueness
A third challenge a parent may raise against a compulsory attendance
law is that the law is impermissibly vague. In Connally v. General Construc-
tion Company,12 8 the United States Supreme Court held that a statute is
void due to vagueness if the conduct forbidden by the statute is so vaguely
or unclearly defined that persons "of common intelligence must necessar-
ily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." 129 The danger of
vague laws is that such laws do not allow ordinary citizens to determine
which acts are lawful and which are prohibited. °3 0 Furthermore, vague
laws give unwarranted discretion to enforcing officials and may inhibit the
exercise of protected civil rights.' 3 ' The vagueness objection is available
to all home schoolers, whether religiously or secularly motivated, and has
proven to be an effective means of challenging many state statutes. i3 2
Statutes that are vulnerable to vagueness challenges characteristically
employ broad, undefined language that is neither clarified elsewhere in
the statute nor, in any government guidelines or regulations.' 3 3 One ex-
ample of allegedly vague statutory language, often used in state compul-
sory attendance laws, is language that grants an exemption from public
school attendance to children receiving substantially equivalent instruc-
tion outside of the public schools.' 3 4 If the statute elsewhere contains re-
127. For a discussion of the proposition that Smith has little impact on home
schoolers, see supra note 106 and accompanying text.
128. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
129. Id. at 391.
130. See Lines, supra note 36, at 211 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108-10 (1972)).
131. Id.
132. SeeJeffery v. O'Donnell, 702 F. Supp. 516, 520-21 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (strik-
ing down state compulsory attendance statute as unconstitutionally vague); Fellow-
ship Baptist Church v. Benton, 620 F. Supp. 308, 318 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (same),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 815 F.2d 485, 495-96 (8th Cir. 1987); Ellis v. O'Hara, 612
F. Supp. 379, 380-82 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 802 F.2d 462
(8th Cir. 1986); Roemhild v. State, 308 S.E.2d 154, 156-59 (Ga. 1983) (same); State
v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn. 1985) (same); State v. Popanz, 332
N.W.2d 750, 756 (Wis. 1983) (same).
133. See Lachman, supra note 64, at 744 (citing examples of impermissibly
vague language). For a discussion of specific compulsory attendance statutes
found to be unconstitutionally vague, see infra notes 137-39 and 142-44 and accom-
panying text.
134. See ALAsKA STAT. § 14.30.010(b)(11) (1992) (exempting child if equally
well-served by approved educational experience); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-184
(West 1986) (exempting child if receiving equivalent instruction); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 14, § 2703 (a) (1993) (exempting child if elsewhere receiving regular and thor-
ough instruction); IDAHO CODE § 33-202 (Supp. 1994) (exempting child if other-
wise comparably instructed); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-8.1-3-34 (West 1995)
(exempting child if receiving equivalent instruction); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A,§ 5001-A(3)(A) (West 1993) (same); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-301(a) (Supp.
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quirements governing instruction and teacher qualifications for the public
schools, courts have concluded that the average person could make sense
of the statute and have upheld the statute against vagueness challengesls 5
Similarly, if the state has promulgated regulations defining the meaning of
the terms and their requirements, courts have held that the average per-
son could understand the statute, through examination of the regulations,
and have upheld the statute.' 3 6 Where, however, a statute containing
equivalency language is not illuminated by either statutory provisions or
state regulations, courts in Iowa,' 37 Minnesota 38 and Missouri I3 9 have de-
clared the statutes unconstitutionally vague.
Another example of common statutory language vulnerable to a
vagueness challenge is where a compulsory attendance statute allows an
1994) (exempting child if otherwise receiving regular and thorough instruction);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 76, § 1 (West 1982) (exempting child otherwise in-
structed in approved manner); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:38-25 (West 1989) (exempt-
ing child if receiving equivalent instruction); N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3204(2) (McKinney
1995) (exempting child if receiving substantially equivalent instruction); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 10-105(A) (West Supp. 1995) (exempting child if other means
of education provided); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 13-27-3 (Supp. 1994) (exempt-
ing child if receiving alternative instruction).
135. See, e.g., Clonlara, Inc. v. Runkel, 722 F. Supp. 1442, 1460 (E.D. Mich.
1989) (upholding Michigan compulsory attendance law against vagueness claim
on ground that legislature had provided adequate statutory guidance); Care & Pro-
tection of Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592, 596-98 (Mass. 1987) (upholding state compul-
sory attendance law against vagueness claim on ground that adequate standards
for approval of home schools, although not explicitly listed in statute, could be
gathered from related statutes dealing with education).
136. See, e.g., Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (up-
holding New York compulsory attendance law against vagueness challenge because
law had been supplemented by extensive regulations promulgated by state depart-
ment of education); Bangor Baptist Church v. Department of Educ. & Cultural
Servs., 549 F. Supp. 1208, 1227 (D. Me. 1982) (holding that Maine compulsory
attendance statute was not unconstitutionally vague in light of state guidelines and
regulations); Bayes v. State, 785 P.2d 660, 665-67 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting
vagueness challenge to Idaho compulsory attendance law because state depart-
ment of education had published regulations and policies that offered guidance to
home schoolers).
137. Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 620 F. Supp. 308, 318 (S.D. Iowa
1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 815 F.2d 485, 495-96 (8th Cir. 1987). The Eighth
Circuit affirmed the finding of the district court that the term "equivalent instruc-
tion" in the Iowa statute was unconstitutionally vague, but remanded for further
consideration in light of newly adopted standards by the state. Id.
138. State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn. 1985). The requirement
of the Minnesota statute that home school teachers have qualifications "essentially
equivalent" to public school teachers was struck down as unconstitutionally vague.
Id.
139. Ellis v. O'Hara, 612 F. Supp. 379, 380-82 (E.D. Mo. 1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 802 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1986). Because the term "substantially equivalent"
was not defined in the statute or clarified by regulations, the district court struck
down the Missouri compulsory attendance statute as unconstitutionally vague. 612
F. Supp. at 380-82. The Eighth Circuit reversed on the ground of mootness after
Missouri amended the statute. 802 F.2d at 463.
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exemption for "private schools" 40 or for students instructed by a "quali-
fied" or "competent" private tutor. 4 1 Again, unless the state clarifies the
meaning of this language through statutory definition or regulation,
courts may strike down the statute for vagueness, as they have done in
Georgia, 142 Pennsylvania 4s and Wisconsin."4 Generally, if the state has
provided no standards or definitions, either by statute or by regulation,
the parent has an excellent chance of defeating the statutory requirements
on vagueness grounds. 145
4. Lack of Neutral, Detached Magistrate
A fourth defense available to home schoolers is a Fourteenth Amend-
ment procedural due process argument that decisions affecting funda-
mental rights must be made by a neutral and detached magistrate.' 4 6
Decisions impacting the fundamental rights of citizens cannot be made by
140. See ALA. CODE § 16-28-3 (1987) (providing private school attendance as
alternative to public school attendance); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48222 (West 1993)
(exempting private school attendance); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 105, para. 5/26-1(1)
(Smith-Hurd 1993) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1111(a) (2) (1992) (same); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 159.030(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992) (same); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 380.1561(3) (a) (West 1988) (exempting attendance at nonpublic
school); NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-1701 (1994) (exempting private school attendance);
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.033 (a) (1) (West 1987 & Supp. 1995) (same).
141. See ALA. CODE § 16-28-3 (1987) (exempting instruction by competent
private tutor); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48224 (West 1993) (exempting instruction by
private tutor or other person holding valid state credential for grade taught); N.Y.
EDuc. LAW § 3204(2) (McKinney 1995) (exempting instruction by competent
teacher); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3321.04(A) (2) (Anderson 1994) (exempting in-
struction by qualified teacher); R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-19-2 (Supp. 1994) (exempting
thorough and efficient instruction); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28A.225.010(4)(c)
(West Supp. 1995) (exempting instruction by sufficiently qualified parent
teacher); W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1 (Exemption B)(a) (Supp. 1994) (exempting in-
struction by qualified person).
142. Roemhild v. State, 308 S.E.2d 154, 156-59 (Ga. 1983). The lack of any
statutory language or administrative rules or regulations defining the term "private
school" rendered the Georgia statute unconstitutionally vague. Id.
143. Jeffery v. O'Donnell, 702 F. Supp. 516, 520-21 (M.D. Pa. 1988). The
court struck down the Pennsylvania statute as unconstitutionally vague because the
court could find "no standards for determining who is a qualified tutor or what is a
satisfactory curriculum in any [school] district." Id. at 521. There was wide disa-
greement among the school districts themselves as to the meaning of the statute;
among the 501 districts there were as many as 36 different interpretations of the
statute. Id. at 520.
144. State v. Popanz, 332 N.W.2d 750, 756 (Wis. 1983). The court held the
term "private school" to be unconstitutionally vague where it was undefined by the
statute or regulations. Id.
145. See, e.g., id. But see Burrow v. State, 669 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Ark. 1984)
(finding term "private school" not unconstitutionally vague on ground that aver-
age person would derive instruction from common meaning of words); State v.
Buckner, 472 So. 2d 1228, 1229-30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (same).
146. See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939) (hold-
ing that permitting person with unbridled discretion to make decisions regarding
exercise of fundamental rights is unconstitutional).
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persons or entities that have an interest in the matter. 14 7 For example,
school boards and school superintendents may have a financial incentive
to rule against home schoolers because public schools are generally par-
tially funded on the basis of their average daily attendance. 148
Although at least one court has considered the possibility of a due
process violation when a school board or superintendent has the discre-
tion to approve or disapprove requests to establish home schools, 149 the
majority of courts have rejected this argument. 150 These courts have con-
sistently rejected the need for a completely neutral, detached magistrate
by construing the school board's function as ministerial rather than discre-
tionary, 5 1 labeling the superintendent's decision-making authority as
"not unbridled,"15 2 or finding that the probability of actual bias on the
part of school officials is not high enough to be unconstitutionally
intolerable. 153
In any case, the objection is of questionable value to home schoolers
in light of the majority of courts' reluctance to accept the argument that
parents have a fundamental right to direct their children's education. 154
If the courts do not recognize this interest as fundamental, any invalidity
claim based on the lack of a neutral, detached magistrate is seriously un-
dermined. 155 Furthermore, any statute that grants broad decision-making
authority to officials may be subject to a vagueness challenge. 15 6 Although
religiously motivated parents, whose free exercise of religion is affected by
147. See id. at 514-16.
148. See Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 620 F. Supp. 308, 318 (S.D.
Iowa 1985) (reversed with regard to payment of attorney's fees), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 815 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1987). In Benton, the district court recognized that
"local school boards have an inherent conflict of interest since each student in a
private school is potentially a source of additional state aid." Id. at 318.
149. Id.
150. See Care & Protection of Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592, 597-98 (Mass. 1987)
(holding that statute delegating power to approve home schools to school boards
was constitutional); State v. Brewer, 444 N.W.2d 923, 924-25 (N.D. 1989) (holding
that statute granting school boards power to determine whether students are enti-
tled to exemptions from compulsory school attendance was constitutional); State v.
Anderson, 427 N.W.2d 316, 320 (N.D.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 965 (1988) (holding
that statute granting school boards power to monitor attendance of home school
children was constitutional).
151. Anderson, 427 N.W.2d at 320.
152. Charles, 504 N.E.2d at 598.
153. Brewer, 444 N.W.2d at 924-25; see also Crites v. Smith, 826 S.W.2d 459,
464-66 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that commissioner of department of edu-
cation was acting within his discretion in interpreting baccalaureate degree exemp-
tion clause in state home schooling statute so as to grant zero exemptions over
span of six years).
154. For a discussion of the proposition that parents have a' fundamental
right to direct their children's education, see supra notes 46-83 and accompanying
text.
155. See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 514-16 (1939).
156. See Charles, 504 N.E.2d at 596 (noting that claims for vagueness and
claims for unlawful delegation of legislative authority are closely related).
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a school board's or superintendent's decision, may have a procedural due
process claim, such an objection is more easily advanced through a free
exercise claim. 15 7
5. Establishment Clause
Another possible defense available to religiously motivated home
schoolers is that the statute in question violates the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment. 158 In Lemon v. Kurtzman,159 the United States
Supreme Court set forth a three prong test for determining whether a
statute can survive an Establishment Clause challenge: "First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion[;] ... fi-
nally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement
with religion.'-"160 Although the Court has not overruled Lemon, more
recent decisions have focused upon the single issue of whether the state
has endorsed or coerced participation in a particular religion.1 6'
The Establishment Clause could conceivably apply to home education
by prohibiting excessive government supervision of religious home
schools. 162 The few higher courts that have considered the matter, how-
ever, have rejected this defense.163 These courts have found that require-
157. For a discussion of free exercise challenges, see supra notes 84-127 and
accompanying text.
158. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion .... " Id. The First Amendment is made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1 (1947) (applying Establishment Clause to states). For a general discussion of the
current application of the Establishment Clause, see Paula Savage Cohen, Psycho-
Coercion, a New Establishment Clause Test: Lee v. Weisman and Its Initial Effect, 73 B.U.
L. REv. 501 (1993); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case
Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 555 (1991);
Michael M. Maddigan, The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and the Public Church,
81 CAL. L. REV. 293 (1993); Matthew S. Steffey, Redefining the Modern Constraints of
the Establishment Clause: Separable Principles of Equality, Subsidy, Endorsement, and
Church Autonomy, 75 MARQ. L. Rv. 903 (1992).
159. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
160. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
161. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (employing coercion test
rather than Lemon test); Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226 (1990) (restating Establishment Clause test as being whether legisla-
tion in question constitutes endorsement of religion); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bul-
lock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (same).
162. Lines, supra note 36, at 209-10 (finding that certain compulsory attend-
ance laws may be subject to Establishment Clause attack based upon excessive en-
tanglement of church and state).
163. See, e.g., Sheridan Rd. Baptist Church v. State, 396 N.W.2d 373, 383
(Mich. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1050 (1987) (holding that "requiring all teach-
ers to be certified does not impermissibly tangle government with religion"); State
v. Anderson, 427 N.W.2d 316, 320-22 (N.D.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 965 (1988) (re-
jecting contention that compulsory attendance law's pre-approval requirement
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ments of government approval and teacher certification represent an
example of the inevitable and necessary relationship between church and
state and do not constitute a violation of any of the three elements of the
Lemon test.16 In light of the relatively minor entanglement of church and
state resulting from government monitoring of home education programs,
it is doubtful that either the Lemon or more recent tests will provide relief
to home schoolers under the Establishment Clause.
6. Equal Protection
Home schoolers have also invoked the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a challenge to state compulsory attendance
statutes.1 65 Generally, courts have not found that home schoolers repre-
sent a suspect class ' 6 or that the laws impair a fundamental right,1 6 7 and
thus have refused to apply strict scrutiny to the statutes. In most instances,
home schoolers have failed to demonstrate that the statutes have a dis-
criminatory purpose. As a result, the courts have declined to find a sus-
pect classification. 168
and teacher certification requirement for religious home schools violates Establish-
ment Clause).
164. See Sheridan, 396 N.W.2d at 383 (discussing Lemon three prong test for
determining whether statute violates Establishment Clause); Anderson, 427 N.W.2d
at 320-21 (same).
165. See, e.g., Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1043-44 (8th Cir. 1988) (an-
alyzing home schoolers' equal protection argument); Null v. Board of Educ., 815
F. Supp. 937, 940 (S.D. W. Va. 1993) (same); Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F.
Supp. 452, 461-62 (N.D. 111. 1974) (same). For a general discussion of the Equal
Protection Clause, see George C. Hlavac, Interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause:
A Constitutional Shell Game, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1349 (1993); Donald E. Lively &
Stephen Plass, Equal Protection: The Jurisprudence of Denial and Evasion, 40 AM. U.L.
REv. 1307 (1991).
166. See, e.g., Murphy, 852 F.2d at 1043-44 (stating that "[w]hile home school
families impelled by deep-seated religious convictions might be the type of 'dis-
crete and insular minority' to which Justice Stone referred in footnote four of
United States v. Carolene Prod. Co. [citations omitted], the broad secular category
of individuals who prefer to school their children at home is not"); Null, 815 F.
Supp. at 940 (noting that complaint referred to no suspect class and applying ra-
tional basis test); Scoma, 391 F. Supp. at 461-62 (same).
167. See, e.g., Murphy, 852 F.2d at 1043-44 (finding no fundamental right of
parents to direct their children's education and applying rational basis test); Nul4
815 F. Supp. at 940 (same); Hinrichs v. Whitburn, 772 F. Supp. 423, 432-33 (W.D.
Wis. 1991) (same), aff'd, 975 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1992); Clonlara, Inc. v. Runkel,
722 F. Supp. 1442, 1457 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (same); Hanson v. Cushman, 490 F.
Supp. 109, 115 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (same); Scoma, 391 F. Supp. at 461-62 (same);
State v. Edgington, 663 P.2d 374, 377-78 (N.M. Ct. App.) (same), cert. denied, 662
P.2d 645 (N.M.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 940 (1983).
168. See Murphy, 852 F.2d at 1043-44 (refusing to apply strict scrutiny because
of lack of showing of discriminatory intent); Clonlara, 722 F. Supp. at 1457 (same).
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In Texas Education Agency v. Leeper,169 however, home schoolers suc-
cessfully challenged a compulsory attendance policy on the ground that
the classification did not bear even a rational relationship to a valid state
objective. 170 In Leeper, a Texas court held that the Texas Education
Agency's interpretation of a state compulsory attendance law granting an
exemption to children attending private or parochial schools violated
home educators' equal protection rights.171 The Agency had refused to
designate home schools as a member of this exempt class, based solely on
the fact that such schools were located in private homes. 172 Because the
distinction in classification bore no "fair and substantial relation" to the
state's objective of educating all children, the court found that the parents
had been deprived of equal protection under the law. 173
Home schoolers will need to employ challenges, inlcuding those
based on the Free Exercise Clause; the parental liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment; vagueness; lack of a neutral, detached magis-
trate; the Establishment Clause; or the Equal Protection Clause only if they
live in a state that places burdensome restrictions upon home education.
The states differ widely in their treatment of home schooling, and pro-
spective home schoolers should examine the compulsory education laws
of their state to determine what requirements exist. In part IV, this Com-
ment analyzes the requirements found in the compulsory education stat-
utes of the fifty states and the District of Columbia.
IV. STATUTORY ANALYSIS
Compulsory school attendance laws exist in every state and the Dis-
trict of Columbia. 174 As recently as 1983, only about half of these states
169. 843 S.W.2d 41 (Tx. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd in part, revd in part, 1994 Tex.
LEXIS 100 (Tex. 1994) (reversing only injunctive aspect of lower court's
judgment).
170. Id. at 50-51. Leeper was a class action suit brought by home school par-
ents and home school providers seeking a declaratory judgment that home schools
meeting certain criteria are exempt from the Texas compulsory attendance law
under the statute's private or parochial school exemption. Id. at 43-44.
171. Id. at 50-51.
172. Id. at 46-47.
173. Id. at 50-51. According to the court:
[T] he Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to States the power to treat
different classes of persons in different ways. The Equal Protection
Clause of that amendment does, however, deny to States the power to
legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a stat-
ute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the
objective of that statute.
Id. at 50.
174. See ALA. CODE §§ 16-28-1, -3, -5 (1987); ALAsKA STAT. § 14.30.010(a)
(1992); AIuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-802(A) (1) (Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 6-
18-201 (Michie 1993); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West 1993); COLO. RV. STAT.
ANN. § 22-33-104 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-184
(West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2702 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-402
(1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.01 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-
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permitted home instruction by a parent.1 75 As a result of rapid gains ac-
complished by home schoolers through the state legislatures, 176 however,
all of the states and the District of Columbia now allow home schooling
under certain conditions. 177 Still, there remains great disparity among
the states in the extent that home schools are regulated. The following
sections will serve to roughly categorize the various state approaches to
home schooling and to analyze their impact on home schoolers, as well as
to note briefly the possible objections to the regulations available to home
schoolers. 178 Section A will examine those states that exempt home in-
struction that is substantially equivalent to the instruction provided in the
public schools. 17 9 Section B will look at those states that treat home
schools as private or church schools. 180 Finally, Section C will examine
those states that explicitly exempt home instruction, and will further ana-
lyze the different notification and approval requirements, time and curric-
690.1 (1992); HAw. REv. STAT. § 298-9(a) (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 33-202
(Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 105, para. 5/ 26-1 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE
ANN. § 20-8.1-3-34 (West 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 299.1 (West Supp. 1994); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 72-1111 (1992); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 159.010 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:221 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5001-A (West 1993); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-301 (a) (Supp.
1994); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 76, § 1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994); MIcH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 380.1561 (West 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (West 1993 &
Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91 (Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 167.031
(Vernon Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-102 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-
201 (1994); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 392.040 (Michie 1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 193:1 (1989); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 18A:38-25 (West 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-12-
2 (Michie 1993); N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3204 (McKinney 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115C-378 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 15-34.1-01 (1993); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 3321.04 (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 10-105 (West Supp.
1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 339.010 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327(a)
(1992); R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-19-1 (Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-65-10 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 13-27-1 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 49-6-3001(c) (Supp. 1994); TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.032 (West 1987 & Supp.
1995); UTAH CODE § 53A-11-101 (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1121 (1989); VA.
CODE ANN. § 22.1-254 (Michie 1993) WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28A. 225.010 (West
Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1 (Supp. 1994); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 118.15 (West
1991 & Supp. 1994); Wvo. STAT. § 21-4-102 (1992).
175. See Lines, supra note 36, at 197 (stating that, in 1983, about one-half of
states permitted home instruction). Those states that did allow home instruction
by an uncertified parent in 1983 are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Geor-
gia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington and Wyoming. Id. at 227-34.
176. See Devins, supra note 9, at 819 (noting that 34 states have adopted home
schooling statutes or regulations since 1982).
177. See Smith and Klicka, supra note 4, at 306 (finding that all states permit
home schooling under certain conditions).
178. For a general discussion of the objections to state regulations available to
home schoolers, see supra notes 39-173 and accompanying text.
179. For a further discussion of equivalent instruction states, see infra notes
182-86 and accompanying text.
180. For a further discussion of states that treat home schools as private or
church schools, see infra notes 187-98 and accompanying text.
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ulum requirements, teacher qualification requirements and assessment
requirements provided in the various statutes.181
A. Equivalent Instruction
Thirteen states make no explicit provision for home schools but do
allow as an exemption to compulsory school attendance instruction that is
substantially equivalent to that provided in the public schools. 182 These
states excuse children from attending public schools if, for example, the
child "is otherwise provided with alternate instruction for an equivalent
period of time, as in the public schools, in the basic skills of language arts
and mathematics."' 8 3 Residents of these states who wish to educate their
children at home should consult with their state board of education to
determine by which home school regulations they must abide.
The most common problem confronting home schoolers in
equivalent instruction jurisdictions is when a regulation exists with which a
home schooler, for any number of reasons, refuses to comply.1 84 Often,
the regulation infringes upon the home schooler's religious beliefs. 185
181. For a further discussion of states that explicitly exempt home instruc-
tion, see infra notes 199-228 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-184 (West 1986) (exempting child
from compulsory attendance if "parent or person having control of such child is
able to show that the child is elsewhere receiving equivalent instruction in the
studies taught in the public schools"); IDAHO CODE § 33-202 (Supp. 1994) (ex-
empting child from compulsory attendance if child "is otherwise comparably in-
structed" in subjects commonly taught in state public schools); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 20-8.1-3-34 (West 1995) (exempting child from compulsory attendance if child
"is being provided with instruction equivalent to that given in the public schools").
The remaining states that grant an exemption to compulsory attendance for in-
struction that is substantially equivalent to that provided in the public schools in-
clude: ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.010(b)(11) (1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2703
(1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5001-A(3) (West 1993); MD. CODE ANN.,
EDUC. § 7-301(a) (1991); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 76, § 1 (West 1982 & Supp.
1994); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 392.070 (Michie 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:38-25
(West 1989); N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3204(2) (McKinney 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70,
§ 10-105 (West Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 13-27-3 (Supp. 1994).
183. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 13-27-3 (Supp. 1994).
184. See Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 866 F.2d 548, 549 (2d Cir. 1989) (parents
challenging regulation requiring home educators to provide school district with
detailed course and teacher information and to allow home visits by school offi-
cials); New Life Baptist Church Academy v. Town of E. Longmeadow, 885 F.2d
940, 941 (1st Cir. 1989) (parents challenging state approval regulation), cert. de-
nied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990); Blount v. Department of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551
A.2d 1377, 1378 (Me. 1988) (parents challenging state prior approval regulation);
State v. McDonough, 468 A.2d 977, 978 (Me. 1983) (parents refusing to submit
home instruction plan or to obtain pre-approval required by state regulation).
185. New Life Baptist Church, 885 F.2d at 944 (state approval burdens religious
beliefs of home school); see Blount, 551 A.2d at 1379-80 (state pre-approval require-
ment infringing on parents' sincerely held religious belief).
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For the most part, however, equivalent instruction states have seen consid-
erably less home school litigation than states taking other approaches. 186
B. Private and Church Schools
Eight states that do not explicitly recognize home schooling as an ex-
emption to compulsory school attendance instead include home schools
under private or church school exemptions. 187 These jurisdictions treat
home schools as private or church schools, 188 and demand that a home
school meet all of the requirements for either a private or church
school. 189
Alabama, Kansas, Michigan and Nebraska are among the most de-
manding states in their treatment of home schools.1 90 Alabama requires
home schools operated as private schools to have a state certification, and
also requires that all private school teachers be certified. 19 1 The only way
186. But seeJane E. Bahls, The HSLDA Gives a Legal Boost to Parents Who Have
Turned Their Living Rooms into Classrooms, STUDENT LAWYER, Dec. 1993, at 38 (not-
ing that in Massachusetts one-third of state's Home School Legal Defense Associa-
tion members have called Association with legal problems in past year).
187. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 16-28-1, -3, -5 (1987). The Alabama Code provides
that "[e]very child between the ages of seven and 16 years shall be required to
attend a public school, private school, church school, or be instructed by a compe-
tent private tutor for the entire length of the school term." Id. § 16-28-3. Also, all
private schools must hold a state certificate and "[t]he instruction in such schools
... shall be by persons holding certificates issued by the state superintendent of
education." Id. § 16-28-1. The statute defines church schools as schools "operated
as a ministry of a local church, group of churches, denomination, and/or associa-
tion of churches on a nonprofit basis which do not receive any state or federal
funding." Id. Moreover, "[i] nstruction by a private tutor means and includes only
instruction by a person who holds a certificate issued by the state superintendent
of education." Id. § 16-28-5.
188. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 48222, 48224 (West 1993) (providing that
all "[c] hildren who are being instructed in a private full-time day school by persons
capable of teaching shall be exempted" from public school attendance and, alter-
natively, children may be instructed at home by a private tutor holding "a valid
state credential for the grade taught"); I.. ANN. STAT. ch. 105, para. 5/ 26-1(1)
(Smith-Hurd 1993) (exempting from compulsory attendance "[a]ny child attend-
ing a private or parochial school where children are taught the branches of educa-
tion taught to children of corresponding age and grade in the public schools").
189. See e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 159.030(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992)
(exempting from compulsory attendance only children "[w] ho [are] enrolled and
in regular attendance in a private, parochial, or church regular day school"). Ken-
tucky is unique in that section five of the Kentucky Constitution provides that no
person shall "be compelled to send his child to any school to which he may be
conscientiously opposed." Ky. CONST., § 5.
190. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1111 (a) (1992) (exempting child from
compulsory attendance if child attends "a private, denominational or parochial
school taught by a competent instructor"); NEB. Rxv. STAT. § 79-1701 (1994)
(granting alternative of attending private, denominational or parochial school,
which may elect "not to meet state accreditation and approval requirements" if
certain conditions are met, including condition that parents certify that state ac-
creditation and approval requirements "violate sincerely held religious beliefs").
191. ALA. CODE § 16-28-1(1) (1987).
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to escape the certification requirements is for home schools to operate as
church schools, meaning that they must be "operated as a ministry of a
local church, group of churches, denomination, and/or association of
churches." 192 This clearly presents a dilemma to the home schooler who
is not religiously motivated.
A similar dilemma faces home schoolers in Nebraska and Kansas.
Under Nebraska state law, all private schools must be approved and
accredited, processes that require teacher certification, unless parents cer-
tify that the approval and accreditation requirements violate their sin-
cerely held religious beliefs. 193 In Kansas, the state supreme court has
ruled that home schools do not qualify under the state's private school
exemption from compulsory attendance.1 9 4 Only children attending
home schools that are sponsored by a church or religious denomination
are exempted.1 95
Michigan currently stands as the only state that demands teacher cer-
tification for home schoolers under all circumstances. 196 The Michigan
Supreme Court upheld this statutory requirement as applied to secularly
motivated home schoolers, 19 7 but found it unconstitutional as applied to
those with a sincere religious motivation. 19 8
192. Id. § 16-28-1(2).
193. NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-1701 (1994).
194. See In re Anna Sawyer, 672 P.2d 1093, 1097 (Kan. 1983) (finding that
home school does not constitute private school under state statute).
195. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1111(e) (1992). The statute provides, in pertinent
part:
When a recognized church or religious denomination that objects to a
regular public high school provides, offers and teaches, either individu-
ally or in cooperation with another recognized church or religious de-
nomination, a regularly supervised program of instruction, which is
approved by the state board of education, for children of compulsory
school attendance age who have successfully completed the eighth grade,
participation in such a program by any such children whose parents or
persons acting as. parents are members of the sponsoring church or reli-
gious denomination shall be regarded as acceptable school attendance
within the meaning of this act.
Id.
196. MIcH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 380.1561(3) (a) (West 1988) (exempting from
compulsory attendance any child "who is attending regularly and is being taught in
a state approved nonpublic school, which teaches subjects comparable to those
taught in the public schools to children of corresponding age and grade").
197. People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106 (Mich. 1993) (holding that parents
do not have fundamental right to direct their children's secular education free
from reasonable regulation).
198. People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1993) (holding that state
failed to show that certification was least restrictive means of achieving state inter-
est under Free Exercise Clause analysis).
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [1994], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol39/iss5/5
C. Statutes Explicitly Recognizing Home Instruction
The remaining thirty jurisdictions expressly exempt home schools or
private instruction from their compulsory attendance laws.' 9 9 Generally,
the exemption is granted only if the home education program meets sev-
eral statutory requirements. These requirements typically fall within four
categories. First, most states demand that home schoolers notify state or
local education authorities of their intentions, and many require pre-ap-
proval of any home education program.2 00 Second, the great majority of
states set minimum time and curriculum requirements for home
schools. 20 1 Third, many states establish minimum qualifications for home
-school instructors.20 2 Finally, states often take steps to assess the academic
progress of children enrolled in home schools.2 03 Each of these catego-
ries is examined below.
1. Notification and Approval
State notification requirements generally demand that home
schoolers provide the state with notice of their intent to home school, and
often require information regarding the children, teachers and home
school itself.2 0 4 These regulations are rarely objectionable to home
199. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-802(B)(1) (Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 6-15-501 to -507 (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-104 to -104.5
(West 1988 & Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-402 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN.
232.02(B) (4) (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690.1 (1992); HAW.
REv. STAT. § 298-9 (a) (5) (Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 299.1 & 299A.1 to .10
(West Supp. 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:236 & 236.1 (West 1982 & Supp.
1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 37-13-91 (Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 167.031 (Vernon Supp. 1995); MoNT.
CODE ANN. § 2G-5-102 (1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 193:1(I)(b) (Supp. 1994);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-12-2 (Michie 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-564 to -565
(1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-03(5) to -05, 15-34.1-06 to-08 (1993); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 3321.04(A)(2) (Anderson 1994); OR. REv. STAT. § 339.030(3)
(Supp. 1994); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327(d) (1992); R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-19-1
(Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-65-40 & -45 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1993);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3001(c)(2)(c) (Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-
102(1) (b) (ii) (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1121 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-
254 (Michie 1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28A.225.010(1) (b) (West Supp. 1995)
W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1 (Supp. 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 118.15(1)(a) & -.15(4)
(West 1991 & Supp. 1994); Wvo. STAT. § 21-4-102 (1992).
200. For a discussion of state notice and approval requirements, see infra
notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
201. For a discussion of state time and curriculum requirements, see infra
notes 209-16 and accompanying text.
202. For a discussion of state qualification requirements for home school in-
structors, see infra notes 217-28 and accompanying text.
203. For a discussion of state academic assessment requirements, see infra
notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
204. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-802(B) (2) (Supp. 1994) (requiring sub-
mission to superintendent of affidavit stating parent's intent to instruct child at
home); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-15-503(1) (A) (Michie 1993) (requiring written notice
to superintendent of name, date of birth and grade level of each student; name
and address of prior school attended by each student; location of home school;
1994] COMMENT 1341
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core curriculum; proposed schedule of instruction; and qualificationsof teachers);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-104.5(3) (e) (West Supp. 1994) (requiring annual
written notice to school district of name, age and place of residence of each stu-
dent and hours of attendance); D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-405 (1993) (requiring each
teacher who gives private instruction to report to school board of name, address,
sex and date of birth of each student); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.02(4)(b)(1) (West
Supp. 1995) (requiring notice to superintendent within 30 days of establishment
of home school program, including name, date of birth and address of each stu-
dent); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690(c) (1) - (2) (1992) (requiring annual notice to
superintendent of intent to home school, name and age of each student, address
of home school, and statement of which months will be deemed to constitute
school year); HAW. REv. STAT. § 298-9(5) (Supp. 1992) (requiring notice to princi-
pal of local public school of intent to home school); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 299A.3,
299.4 (West Supp. 1994) (requiring filing of form with school district listing name
and age of each student, period of instruction, curriculum outline and textbooks,
and name and address of instructor); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:236.1(A)-(C) (West
Supp. 1995) (requiring annual filing of application with board of education in-
cluding birth certificate of each child and certification that curriculum will equal
that of public schools, as demonstrated through evidence such as course outlines,
textbooks and copies of students' work); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.102 (Subd. 1)
(West Supp. 1995) (requiring annual notice to superintendent of name, age and
address of each student; name of instructor evidence of instructor's competence;
and submission of instruction calendar showing instruction for equal to at least
170 days); Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91(3) (Supp. 1994) (requiring filing of certifi-
cate of enrollment with board of education, including name, address and date of
birth of each student; name and address of parents; signatures of parents; name
and address of home school; and description of education to be received); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 20-5-109(5) (1993) (requiring annual notice to superintendent of
child's attendance at home school); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193A:5(I)-(II) (Supp.
1994) (requiring annual notice to commissioner, superintendent or principal of
intent to home school; name, address and date of birth of each child; and descrip-
tion of subjects to be taught and textbooks to be used); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-
2.1(A) (Michie 1993) (requiring annual notice to superintendent of intent to
home school); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-06 (1993) (requiring annual notice to
superintendent of intent to home school; name, address and date of birth of each
student; name and address of parents; intent and qualifications of instructor; cur-
riculum; and submission of oath that will comply with statute); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 3321.04(A) (2) (Anderson 1994) (requiring that parents obtain excuse
from superintendent to home school); OR. REv. STAT. § 339.035(2) (Supp. 1994)
(requiring written notification to superintendent of intent to home school); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327.1(b)(1) (1992) (requiring annual notarized affidavit
from parents including name and age of each student, name of teacher, address
and telephone number of home school, outlines of required subjects, immuniza-
tion records and certification that instructor has not been convicted of criminal
offense); R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-19-1 to-2 (Supp. 1994) (requiring approval of school
committee); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-65-40(B) (Law. Co-op. 1990) (requiring notice
to district board of trustees of description of program, textbooks, methods of eval-
uation and place of instruction); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3050(b) (1) (Supp.
1994) (requiring annual notice to superintendent of name, telephone number,
age and grade level of each student; location of home school; curriculum; and
qualifications of instructor); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-102(1)(b)(ii) (1994) (re-? uiring annual release from board of education); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 166b(a)
1989) (requiring name and age of child; names, addresses and telephone num-
bers of parents and instructors; school district in which home study program is
located; and course outlines); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254.1(B),(C) (Michie Supp.
1994) (requiring annual notice to superintendent of intent to home school, curric-
ulum and scores on achievement tests); W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1 (Exemption
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schoolers, and the courts have recognized the state's interest in verifying
that its compulsory attendance laws are indeed being satisfied. 20 5
Some states require approval as well as notification, and these state
approval requirements have proven more difficult for home schoolers to
accept.20 6 Parents who otherwise may have no complaint about simple
notification may strongly object to submitting their plans for state ap-
proval, most commonly on religious grounds.2 0 7 Free exercise challenges
to approval requirements, however, have generally failed because courts
have found state approval to be the least restrictive means of furthering a
state's compelling interest in ensuring the education of its children.20 8
2. Time and Curriculum Requirements
A state's time requirements refer to the number of hours or days chil-
dren must spend receiving instruction in the classroom. Many states re-
quire that children attending home schools spend, at a minimum, an
equal amount of time in the classroom as do their public and private
B) (b) (1) (Supp. 1994) (requiring notice to superintendent or school board of
intent to home school and name and address of each student); Wyo. STAT. § 21-4-
102(b) (1992) (requiring annual notice to school board of curriculum and submis-
sion of proof that home school is meeting requirements of statute).
205. See, e.g., State v. Rivera, 497 N.W.2d 878, 881 (Iowa 1993) (finding "no
alternative to reasonable reporting requirements" for home schoolers); State v.
McDonough, 468 A.2d 977, 978-80 (Me. 1983) (rejecting challenge by home
school parents who refused to submit required home instruction plan); Care &
Protection of Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592, 598-600 (Mass. 1987) (finding that state
notification and approval process, that requires submission of home school propo-
sal outlining curriculum, materials to be used and instructor qualifications, neces-
sary to promote effectively state's interest in educating all children); State v.
DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254, 257-73 (Vt. 1990) (rejecting challenge by home school
parents who failed to comply with state reporting requirements).
206. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-19-1 to -2 (Supp. 1994) (requiring approval
of school committee).
207. See, e.g., New Life Baptist Church Academy v. Town of E. Longmeadow,
885 F.2d 940, 941 (1st Cir. 1989) (acknowledging that according to religious
school, it was a "sin to 'submit' education plan to secular authority for approval"),
cert denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990); Blount v. Department of Educ. & Cultural Servs.,
551 A.2d 1377, 1380 (Me. 1988) (finding that applying to state for approval was of
symbolic significance to home schoolers and placed substantial burden on their
religious exercise); State v. Schmidt, 505 N.E.2d 627, 628 (Ohio) (stating that fun-
damentalist home school parents refused to seek approval of home school pro-
gram on religious grounds), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 942 (1987); State v. Riddle, 285
S.E.2d 359, 363 (W. Va. 1981) (stating that fundamentalist home school parents
failed to seek necessary approval of home instruction program on religious
grounds).
208. See, e.g., New Life Baptist Church, 885 F.2d at 944-52 (finding that "stan-
dardized testing" alternative is not less restrictive alternative for First Amendment
purposes); Blount, 551 A.2d at 1382-85 (finding "private school status" satisfies
compelling public interest in educational quality); Schmidt, 505 N.E.2d at 628-30
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school counterparts.20 9 Other states provide specific time requirements
within their home school exemptions.2 10 Georgia, for example, insists
that parents provide a minimum of four-and-one-half hours of instruction
per day for at least 180 days.2 11 To date, there are no reported challenges
to such regulations.
Curriculum requirements are also common in home school provi-
sions. As with time requirements, state statutes generally either refer
home schoolers to the standards for public schools2 1 2 or include specific
requirements within the provision.2 13 Pennsylvania's home education
209. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-402(d) (1993) (requiring instruction time
equal to that of public schools); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-564 (1994) (same); OR.
REv. STAT. § 339.030(3) (Supp. 1994) (same); R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-19-2 (Supp.
1994) (requiring instruction time "substantially equal" to that of public schools);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3050(b) (3) (Supp. 1994) (requiring number of school
days to be equal to that of public schools); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-
102(1) (b) (ii) (1994) (requiring instruction time equal to that of public schools);
VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254(A) (Michie 1993) (requiring number of school days and
hours of instruction per day to equal that of public schools); WAsH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 28A.225.010 (4) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring hours of instruction to equal
that established for private schools); W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1 (Exemption B) (a)
(Supp. 1994) (requiring instruction time equal to that of public schools).
210. See, e.g., Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-802(B) (1) (Supp. 1994) (requiring
175 school days or equivalent); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-104.5(3)(c) (West
1988) (requiring 172 days, averaging four hours per day); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-
690(b) (3) (1992) (mandating 180 days and at least four-and-a-half hours per day);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 299A.1 (West Supp. 1994) (requiring at least 148 days); LA. Rxv.
STAT. ANN. § 17:236 (West 1982) (defining minimum school session as at least 180
days); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 120.101 (Subd. 5b) (1)-(9) (West Supp. 1995) (requir-
ing at least 170 days of instruction through 1995-96 school years with increasing
hour requirements in subsequent school years); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 167.031(2) (2) (b) (Vernon Supp. 1995) (requiring at least 1000 hours of instruc-
tion); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-109(2) (1993) (mandating at least 180 days of pu-
pil instruction); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-06 (1993) (requiring at least 175 days,
four hours per day); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3321.04 (Anderson 1994) (requiring
at least 32 weeks per year); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327.1(c) (1992) (requiring
minimum of 180 days of instruction or 900 hours per year for elementary levels,
990 hours per year for secondary levels); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-65-40(A) (2) (Law.
Co-op. 1990) (requiring 180 days, four-and-a-half hours per day excluding lunch
and recesses); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 118.165(1) (c) (West 1991) (requiring at least 875
hours per year).
211. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690(b)(3) (1992).
212. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:236 (West 1982) (requiring same cur-
riculum standards as public schools); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-109(4) (1993)
(same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-564 (1994) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-06
(1993) (same); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3321.04(A)(2) (Anderson 1994) (requir-
ing instruction in "the branches in which instruction is required" in public
schools); OR. REv. STAT. § 339.030(3) (Supp. 1994) (requiring same curriculum
standards as public schools); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-102(1)(b)(ii) (1994)
(same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 906 (1989) (requires "minimum course of study"
that equals standards for public schools); W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1 (Exemption B) (a)
(Supp. 1994) (requiring same curriculum standards as public schools).
213. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-802(A) (Supp. 1994) (requiring read-
ing, grammar, mathematics, social studies and science); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-33-104(2) (b) (West 1988) (requiring reading, writing, speaking, mathematics,
1344
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statute contains extensive curriculum requirements for both elementary
and secondary school levels.2 14 For grades nine through twelve, a home
school must provide a child with four years of English; three years of math-
ematics, science and social studies; and two years of arts and humani-
ties.2 15 Specifically, these categories must include courses in English,
including language, literature, speech and composition; science; geogra-
phy; social studies, including civics, world history, United States history
and Pennsylvania history; mathematics, including general mathematics, al-
gebra and geometry; physical education; health; music; art; and safety
education.2 16
3. Teacher Qualifications
Teacher qualifications can be the most burdensome of the state re-
quirements regulating home schools. States that require the certification
of home school instructors force uncertified parents to expend considera-
ble time and expense to achieve state certification.2 17 The mere prospect
history, civics, literature and science); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690(b) (4) (1992) (re-
quiring basic academic educational program, including reading, language arts,
mathematics, social studies and science); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (Subd. 6)
(West Supp. 1995) (requiring reading, writing, literature, fine arts, mathematics,
science, history, geography, government, health and physical education); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 167.031(2) (2) (b) (Vernon Supp. 1994) (requiring "reading, lan-
guage arts, mathematics, social studies and science or academic courses that are
related to the aforementioned subject areas and consonant with the pupil's age
and ability"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 193-A:4(I) (Supp. 1994) (requiring science,
mathematics, language, government, history, health, reading, writing, spelling, his-
tory of constitutions of New Hampshire and United States, and appreciation of art
and music); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-2(V) (Michie 1993) (requiring reading, lan-
guage arts, mathematics, social studies and science); R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-19-2
(Supp. 1994) (requiring reading, writing, geography, arithmetic, United States his-
tory, Rhode Island history and principles of American government); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 59-65-40 (A) (3) (Law. Co-op. 1990) (requiring reading, writing, mathemat-
ics, science, social studies and, for grades seven to 12, composition and literature);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3050(b) (8) (Supp. 1994) (requiring that teacher, if in-
structing college preparatory course, instruct in those "areas of study required for
admission to public four-year colleges of the State of Tennessee," otherwise need
only meet requirements of the public schools); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254.1 (A)
(Michie Supp. 1995) (requiring language arts and mathematics); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 228A.225.010 (4) (a) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring science, mathematics,
language, social studies, history, health, reading, writing, spelling and appreciation
of art and music); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 118.165(1)(d) (West 1991) (requiring read-
ing, language arts, mathematics, social studies, science and health); Wyo. STAT.
§§ 21-4-101 (a) (vi), -102(b) (1992) (requiring reading, writing, mathematics, civics,
history, literature and science).
214. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327.1(c)-(d) (1992).
215. Id. § 13-1327.1(d).
216. Id. § 13-1327.1 (c) (2).
217. See Dorman, supra note 3, at 756-58 (noting substantial barrier state certi-
fication requirements present to home schoolers).
37
MacMullan: The Constitutionality of State Home Schooling Statutes
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
of having to obtain certification can be a major deterrent to home
schooling.2 18
The only three states in which at least certain groups of home
schoolers must obtain certification - Alabama, Michigan and Nebraska
- all treat home schools no differently than private schools.2 19 States
with explicit home school provisions in their compulsory attendance laws
generally provide for optional teacher certification. 220 Florida, for exam-
ple, allows a parent to teach at a home school if the parent either holds a
valid state certificate or meets, a short list of requirements. 22 1 These re-
quirements include maintaining a portfolio of the children's work and
providing for annual outside evaluations of the children's work.222
Besides certification, states utilize several other methods in evaluat-
ing the qualifications of home school instructors. Typical methods of
evaluation include the submission of course outlines, 223 maintenance
of minimum education levels for teachers224 and teacher examina-
218. Id.
219. See ALA. CODE §§ 16-28-5 (1987); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN.§ 380.1561(3)(a) (1988); NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-1701 (1994). For a further discus-
sion of these states that treat home schools as private schools, see supra notes 187-
98 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., COLO. Rrv. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-104(2) (i) (I)-(II) (West 1988)
(granting option of obtaining certification or meeting notification and evaluation
requirements); FLA. STAT. ANN. 232.02(4)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1995) (granting op-
tion of obtaining certification or meeting notification, recordkeeping and evalua-
tion requirements); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 299A.2 to -.3 (West Supp. 1994) (granting
option of obtaining state certification or meeting notification, evaluation and re-
porting requirements); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (Subd. 7) (West 1993) (grant-
ing numerous options: certification, supervision by certified person, successful
completion of teacher competency examination, achievement of baccalaureate de-
gree or, if teacher is also parent of child, submission of child to annual achieve-
ment testing); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-06 (1993) (granting option of
certification, successful completion of national teacher examination or, if home
school teacher possesses a high school degree or its equivalent, supervision by cer-
tified teacher).
221. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.02(4)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1995).
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 299A.4(7) (West Supp. 1994) (requiring sub-
mission of course outlines); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:236.1(C)(1)(a) (West Supp.
1995) (requiring submission of course outlines as part of notification); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327.1(b)(1) (1992) (requiring submission of course outlines);
W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1 (Exemption B) (b) (3) (Supp. 1994) (same).
224. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690(c) (3) (1992) (requiring that parent
have high school diploma or its equivalent and that non-parent have baccalaureate
college degree); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (subd. 7) (5) (West 1993) (holding
baccalaureate degree as one option for qualification); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-
2.1(C) (Michie 1993) (requiring high school diploma or its equivalent for qualifi-
cation); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-564 (1994) (same); N.D. CENr. CODE § 15-34.1-06
(1993) (requiring that parent have high school diploma or its equivalent plus su-
pervision by certified teacher as one option); S.C. CODE ANN. 8 59-65-40 (A) (1)
(Law. Co-op. 1990) (requiring that teacher have high school diploma, or its
equivalent, plus passing score on basic skills examination; or baccalaureate
degree); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3050(b)(4), (7) (Supp. 1994) (requiring that
1346 [Vol. 39: p. 1309
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tions.22 5 It is not unusual for statutes to grant discretion to school boards
and superintendents, without further guidance, to determine whether an
instructor is qualified.22
6
Occasionally, instructors are given numerous options to prove their
qualifications. For example, Washington allows home school teachers to
meet state qualification requirements by either accumulating forty-five
quarter-hours of undergraduate credit, completing a home school instruc-
tion course, agreeing to supervision by a certified teacher, or otherwise
demonstrating sufficient qualifications to the satisfaction of the school su-
perintendent. 22 7 Much less effort is needed in Minnesota, however, where
one option for fulfilling the home school teacher qualification is merely
that the instructor be the parent of a child whose performance is assessed
using a nationally standardized achievement examination.2 2 8
4. Assessment
Most states require some method of assessing the academic progress
of children enrolled in home schools. Many states require that home
school students take a state or national standardized test administered by a
state official at certain times in their home school educations.2 2 9 If a
teacher have high school diploma or its equivalent for kindergarten through grade
eight, baccalaureate degree for grades nine through 12 but can request exemp-
tion); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254.1(A) (i) (Michie Supp. 1995) (requiring baccalau-
reate degree as one option for qualification); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 28A.225.010 (4) (b) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring 45 college level quarter credit
hours as one option for qualification); W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1 (Exemption B)
(b) (2) (Supp. 1994) (requiring high school diploma or its equivalent plus formal
education level four years higher than most academically advanced child for whom
instruction will be provided).
225. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (Subd. 7) (3) (West 1993) (passing
state teacher competency examination is one option for qualification); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 15-34.1-06 (1993) (passing national teacher examination is one option for
qualification); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-65-40(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1990) (requiring
that, if lacking baccalaureate degree, parent has high school diploma or its
equivalent plus passing score on basic skills examination).
226. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.04(A) (2) (Anderson 1994) (stat-
ing that superintendent may excuse child from public schooling if taught at home
by person deemed qualified to teach); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.225.010(c)
(West Supp. 1995) (stating that superintendent may determine if instructor suffi-
ciendy qualified); W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1 (Exemption B) (a) (Supp. 1994) (same).
227. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28A.225.010(c) (West Supp. 1995).
228. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (subd. 7) (6) (West 1993).
229. See, e.g., Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-802(B) (2) (Supp. 1994) (requiring
nationally standardized achievement test at least every three years); ARv_ CODE
ANN. § 6-15-504(a) (Michie 1993) (requiring annual standardized achievement
testing); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-104.5(3)(f) (West Supp. 1994) (requiring
testing in grades three, five, seven, nine and 11); FLA. STAT. ANN.
232.02(4) (b) (3) (b)-(c) (West Supp. 1995) (using testing as one option for evalua-
tion); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690(c) (7) (1992) (requiring testing at least every
three years); IowA CODE ANN. § 299A.4(1) (West Supp. 1994) (using testing as one
option for evaluation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (Subd. 8)(a) (West 1993) (us-
ing annual testing); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 193-A:6(II)(b)-(c) (Supp. 1994) (an-
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child's test scores indicate that the child has failed to perform at his or her
peers' grade level, states generally provide some time for remedial meas-
ures.23 0 If these are ineffective and the child continues to perform at a
level below his or her peers, school boards have the authority to require
the child to enroll in a public, private or church school.
2 3 1
nual testing is option to complete annual evaluation); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-
2.1 (D) (Michie 1993) (using annual testing); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-564 (1994)
(same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-07(1) (1993) (same); OR. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 339.035(3) (Supp. 1994) (same); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327.1(e) (1) (1992)
(requiring testing in grades three, five and eight); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-65-
40(A) (6) (Law. Co-op. 1990) (using annual testing); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-
3050(b) (5) (A) (Supp. 1994) (requiring testing in grades two, five, seven and
nine); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 166b(d)(5)-(6) (1989) (using testing as option for
annual assessment); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254.1(C) (Michie Supp. 1994) (using
testing as one option for evaluation); W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1 (Exemption B)(b)(4)
(Supp. 1994) (using testing as one option for annual assessment).
230. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-15-505(a) (4) (Michie 1993) (providing that
if score is eight months or more behind expected grade level, students are granted
one year to remediate); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-104.5(5) (a) (I) (West Supp.
1994) (providing that if score below thirteenth percentile, student has opportunity
to re-test); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.02 (4) (b) (3) (West Supp. 1995) (granting sub-par
students one year of remedial instruction); IOWA CODE ANN. § 299A.6 to .7 (West
Supp. 1994) (providing one year to remediate if student scores below thirtieth
percentile); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101(Subd. 8) (West 1993) (providing that if
score is below thirtieth percentile or score is one grade level below expected, par-
ents must obtain additional evaluation of student); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-
A:6(III) (Supp. 1994) (providing that if score does not indicate educational pro-
gress, students are granted one year of remedial instruction); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 15-34.1-07(2) (1993) (providing that if students score below thirtieth percentile,
parents can continue home schooling program if file statement from professional
that child is making reasonable academic progress); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-
3050(b) (6) (Supp. 1994) (granting unsatisfactory scores time for remedial instruc-
tion); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254.1(C) (Michie Supp. 1994) (providing that if score
shows inadequate progress, parents must file remediation plan and board of edu-
cation may place program on one year probation); W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1 (Exemp-
tion B) (b) (4) (Supp. 1994) (providing that if student scores below fortieth
percentile, parents must institute remedial program).
231. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.302(4) (b) (3) (West Supp. 1995) ("Contin-
uing in a home education program shall be contingent upon the pupil demon-
strating educational progress commensurate with his [or her] ability .... "); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-A:6(III) (Supp. 1994) (providing continuation in home edu-
cation program as contingent upon child demonstrating progress commensurate
with his or her age and ability); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-07(2) (1993) (provid-
ing if parent does not file statement from licensed professional that child is mak-
ing reasonable academic progress, parent is not entitled to exemption from
compulsory attendance); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.035(3)(d) (Supp. 1994) (providing
that superintendent may order child to attend school if child is not showing satis-
factory educational progress); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-65-40(D) (Law. Co-op. 1990)
(providing district board of trustees the option of placing student in public school,
special services or home schooling with instructional support system if student
scores below promotion standard); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3050(b)(6)(C)(i)
(Supp. 1994) (providing local superintendent of schools to require parents to en-
roll child in public, private or church-related school if child falls behind grade
level); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254.1(C) (Michie Supp. 1994) (requiring home in-
struction to cease if remedial plan ineffective and requiring parent to make other
1348
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Another method of assessing a child's education is by requiring home
school teachers to maintain portfolios of their children's work, which are
in turn submitted to certified teachers for an evaluation of the children's
progress.23 2 In Pennsylvania, a poor evaluation can eventually lead to the
termination of the home school program.2 3 3 Several states provide par-
ents with the option of standardized testing or portfolio evaluation, and
others grant additional choices. 234 New Hampshire, for example, allows
children alternatively to be evaluated by "any other valid measurement
tool mutually agreed upon by. the parent and commissioner of
education." 235
V. CONCLUSION
Home schoolers have made significant gains throughout the country
over the last fifteen years. Currently, every state permits parents to edu-
cate their children at home if they are willing to meet certain require-
ments set forth in state statutes or promulgated by state agencies. Parents
arrangements for child's education in compliance with state statute); W. VA. CODE
§ 18-8-1 (Exemption B) (b) (4) (i) (Supp. 1994) ("if, after two calender years, the
mean of the child's test results fall below the fortieth percentile level, home in-
struction shall no longer satisfy the compulsory school attendance requirement
exemption.")
232. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.02(4) (b) (2) (West Supp. 1995) (providing
that if home school teachers are not certified, must keep portfolio of records and
materials); IOWA CODE ANN. § 299A.4(7) (b) (West Supp. 1994) (providing that if
home school teachers do not administer standardized tests, they must submit port-
folio); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:236.1(C)(1)(c) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that
portfolio of each student's work qualifies as evidence to establish quality of curricu-
lium in renewal application); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 167.031(2) (2) (a) (b) (Vernon
Supp. 1995) (requiring maintenance of portfolio of each student's work); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-A:6(I) (Supp. 1994) (same); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-
1327.1(e)(1) (1992) (requiring submission of portfolio of student's records and
materials); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 166b(d)(3)-(4) (1989) (stating that home
school teachers may satisfy annual assessment by submitting student's portfolio
along with either report by parent or report by teacher advisory service).
233. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327.1(e)-(m) (1992) (providing process
for portfolio evaluation).
234. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.02 (4) (b) (3) (a)-(e) (West Supp. 1995)
(granting additional options of evaluation by certified teacher, standardized
testing or any other agreed upon evaluative tool); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:236.1 (C) (1) (a)-(e) (West Supp. 1995) (granting additional option of offering
satisfactory evidence of quality of home school program, including such docu-
ments as course outlines, book lists, copies of student's work, copies of standard-
ized tests and statements by third parties who have observed student's progress);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 193-A:6(II) (a)-(d) (Supp. 1994) (granting options of evalu-
ation by standardized testing, certified teacher or any other agreed upon measure-
ment tool); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 166b(d) (1)-(6) (1989 & Supp. 1994) (granting
options of evaluation by certified teacher, standardized testing, or submission of
reports); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254.1(C) (Michie Supp. 1994) (granting additional
option of any other evaluation or assessment that, in judgment of superintendent,
indicates that child is making adequate educational progress).
235. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 193-A:6(II) (d) (Supp. 1994).
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fortunate enough to live in a state with relatively few restrictions on home
schooling should face no significant obstacles in establishing a program of
home instruction. Parents who are not so fortunate, however, must decide
whether to abandon the idea of home schooling, comply with stringent
state requirements or challenge these restrictions in a court of law.
The legal battle, although winnable, is a difficult one. The various
challenges available to home schoolers against state restrictions on home
schooling include claims based on the Free Exercise Clause; the parental
liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment; vagueness; lack of a
neutral, detached magistrate; the Establishment Clause; and the Equal
Protection Clause. These claims, however, have enjoyed only limited suc-
cess. Given the reluctance of the courts to rule in favor of home schoolers
on such claims, the best hope of success for parents who wish to home
school their children remains where it has rested for over a decade - in
the state legislatures. Only through a combination of politicking and well-
planned legal challenges can home schoolers maintain some hope of over-
coming the more onerous state statutes and regulations restricting home
schooling.
Jack MacMullan
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